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TIDAL TITLE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF THE
BAY: THE CASE OF THE SUBMERGED "HIGH
WATER" MARK
John A. Hum bach* and Jane A. Gale**
The unique character and special public importance of lands bor-
dering the sea have been recognized since ancient times.' In the
nature of things, shore lands, together with the waters which cover
them (permanently or periodically), have a number of valuable uses
not shared generally with inland territories. Navigation,' passage, 3
fishery,4 and bathing5 are among the particular uses of the shore or
adjacent sea for which the public has traditionally received greater
or lesser legal protection. However, this list is neither exclusive, nor
closed. For example, the recent avalanche of accretions to our stock
of ecological knowledge has heightened (if not created) a general
awareness of the economic importance of tidal areas as a source of
ocean nutrients and as a sink for ocean pollutants.7
*Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. B.A., Miami University
(Ohio); J.D. summa cum laude, The Ohio State University College of Law.
**Student, Fordham University School of Law. B.A., Fordham University. At the time of
preparation of the briefs in the Appellate Division in the case of Dolphin Lane Associates,
Ltd. v. Town of Southampton, discussed at length infra, Ms. Gale was a para-legal in the
litigation department at the firm of Mudge, Rose, Guthrie & Alexander, counsel for the Town
of Southampton and the Trustees of the Freeholders and Commonalty of the Town of Sou-
thampton.
1. Comment, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional
Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 763-64 (1970). The author noted that, according to Justinian's
INSTITUTES, the sea and shore were "common to all" and that no one therefore was forbidden
access to the shore. Id., citing JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES 2.1.1-.6. See also F. Maloney & R.
Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean High Water Line in Coastal Boundary
Mapping, 53 N.C. L. REV. 185, 198-99 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Maloney & Ausness].
2. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Shultz, 116 N.Y. 382, 387, 22 N.E. 564, 565 (1889); People v.
Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287 (1863).
3. Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 193 N.Y. 378, 85 N.E. 1093 (1903).
4. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Schultz, 116 N.Y. 382, 22 N.E. 564 (1889); see Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 412 (1842), quoting LOROD HALE, DE JUais MARIaS.
5. Tucci v. Salzhauer, 40 App. Div. 2d 712, 336 N.Y.S.2d 721 (2d Dep't 1972), aff'd, 33
N.Y.2d 854, 307 N.E.2d 256, 352 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1973).
6. It is suggested that there are nine separate uses of or interests in the shore: navigation;
ports; passage; commerce; fishery; sand, gravel, shellfish, and seaweed; bathing (recreation);
conservation and aesthetics; and the "public interest." Comment, supra note 1, at 781-87.
7. See Comment, Can New York's Tidal Wetlands Be Saved? A Constitutional and Com-
mon Law Solution, 39 ALBANY L. REV. 451, 545-56 (1975). The New York State Legislature
has found that wetlands "constitute one of the most vital and productive areas of our natural
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The allocation of the use of inland territories via the market
mechanism, viz. by private purchases and sales of various private
rights to use and/or possess, produces a fairly rational and efficient
pattern of land use for such territories.8 However, it is the character-
istic of shore lands that many of their unique uses may be taken
advantage of efficiently only if such uses are enjoyed by large num-
bers of persons.' For example, the rights to use shorelands for fishing
or bathing do not require exclusivity to be enjoyed, and the enforce-
ment of exclusivity would result in drastic under-utilization of the
shore's capacity to sustain these uses. Of course, the allocation of
the shore for these purposes could still be attempted through private
purchases and sales of private rights of use, since a right to use may
be "private" without necessarily being "exclusive."'" Nonetheless,
inefficiency is bound to result if private purchases and sales are
relied upon to allocate all potential uses of shore lands. The market
mechanism is simply inadequate to effectuate an efficient allocation
of such uses because the "transaction costs" would be too high."
To take an extreme case, if the right to navigate the tidal waters
depended upon negotiation with every owner of the subjacent soil,
navigation (or at least lawful navigation) would be in such areas
impossible. This would be true even if the price exacted by the
subjacent owners were nominal. Transaction costs would form a
world .. "Tidal Wetlands Act §1, N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 790 (McKinney 1973). The Atlantic
commercial fishing industry is dependent on the tidal salt marshes virtually for its existence.
Hitchcock, Can We Save Our Salt Marshes? 141 National Geographic 729 (1972). More than
75 species of fish, including commercially important species, spend some part of their lives
in the marshes and as much as 95 percent of the catch may be nurtured by the marshes. Id.
See also United States v. Baker, 2 Envir. Rptr. Cas. 1849, 1850-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
8. Even for inland territories, the pattern of use produced by the market mechanism is
by no means perfect, as testified to by the need for zoning laws, environmental regulations,
eminent domain proceedings, and other "collective" solutions to resource use and allocation
problems.
9. See generally Comment, supra note 1.
10. For example, the right of an apartment tenant to use common halls and stairways may
be a "private" right, but it is not an "exclusive" one.
11. Transaction costs would include not only the costs (expense and trouble) of finding
the appropriate seller and, for the seller, of having someone available to receive a prospective
buyer; also involved would be the costs of negotiating the transaction of purchase and sale
in which the desired rights to use are acquired and of policing out those who do not pay. Thus,
transaction costs would be borne initially by both buyer and seller. However, such costs may
be partially or wholly shifted from one to the other, depending upon the relative elasticities
of demand and supply for the right to use in question.
[Vol. IV
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barrier to the acquisition of rights of use, 2 and this transaction-cost
barrier would be all out of proportion to the barrier created by
possible costs inherent in the resource utilization itself. The result
would be under-utilization of the shore resource in question. 3
The navigation case, though extreme, is not atypical for shore
front uses. With most if not all of the peculiar shore uses, (e.g.,
bathing, fishing), the use-associated costs 4 are typically close to nil,
whereas the transaction costs are substantial. 5 Hence, the almost
inevitable result of removing shore resources from the public do-
main is to insure under-utilization of the shore.
Where the magnitude and deterrent effect of transaction costs is
greatly disproportionate to the use-associated costs, and the latter
are insubstantial, a cogent argument may be made, in the name of
efficiency and overall welfare, for setting a user-fee of zero-thereby
obviating all transaction costs (though leaving use-associated costs
where they fall). That is to say, an argument exists in such cases,
12. The barrier may be total, as would likely be the case with navigation rights, or it may
be partial, as for example where fishing or bathing rights are involved. In the cases of bathing
and fishing, the appropriate seller of such right (viz. the possessor of the subjacent soil) can
fairly readily establish a collection point and policing mechanism to assure that only those
who pay his price can avail themselves of the rights (or licenses) to use which he may
dispense. If demand is sufficient (in the relevant price range), he may cover his transaction
costs, and the costs associated with use per se, and he may likely achieve a profit (or economic
"rent") besides.
The barrier created by a price which is based on transaction costs, use-associated costs and
economic "rent" will not be a total barrier if there are some potential users willing to pay
such a price. However, if there are potential users willing to pay a price equal to use-
associated costs, but who are not willing to pay additional amounts, then the inclusion of
transaction costs (and economic "rent") in the price will result in at least a partial deterrent
to potential users.
13. Even ignoring the possibility of an economic "rent," the collection of a user-fee which
includes transaction costs will assure (absent infinite inelasticity of demand) that the shore
will be under-utilized compared with the utilization that would occur if use-associated costs
were the only deterrent to use. That is, if the costs of collections and policing are borne out
of user-fees, the amount of such fees will need to be correspondingly higher than would be
fees that reflected use-associated costs alone; thus, charging the higher fees will have the
effect of deterring more potential users than would be deterred if the fee reflected only use-
associated costs.
14. I.e., costs incurred because of the use per se, ignoring the opportunity cost of foregone
economic "rent."
15. Realistically, one must also take account of the fact that, if user-fees are charged and
transaction costs are thereby recovered, the temptation will exist (if demand makes it feasi-
ble) to tack on a further amount as a profit or economic "rent." This of course would exacer-
bate the under-utilization effect of the transaction cost barrier and further justify the position
that the price of use should be zero.
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for conferring a right to use upon the public generally.
By conferring such a public right of use, recognition would be
accorded to pressures to use which, though very real, cannot be
satisfied by the market even though the prices which potential users
are willing to pay may equal or exceed the use-associated costs
involved in such satisfaction. 6 The overpowering effect of dispropor-
tionate transaction costs prevents satisfaction of any part of this
demand except for those potential users who are willing to pay a
huge surcharge over use-associated costs in order to obtain the use.
Only with a societal (i.e., legal) decision to set the price of use at
zero will there be anything like close alignment between the use
demanded (at a price equal to use-associated costs) and the rights
to use which are in fact supplied.
The law has long recognized, though generally implicitly, that the
allocation of shore land uses cannot as a practical matter follow the
private-purchase-and-sale model employed for inland territories;
i.e., that public rights to use must be recognized in order to avoid
the public inconveniences which are the concomitant of under-
utilization. The Romans' answer was to regard the sea and the fore-
shores as res communes: all could use but none could privately
own. 7 After the fall of Rome, when law in general and property law
in particular pragmatically took on something of "might makes
right" aspect, the power of adjacent possession was far more impor-
tant in the allocation of shore land uses than were notions of com-
monality of interest. 8
In England, which achieved a semblance of central control some-
what earlier than the rest of Europe, it was apparently the King who
held the might; under the so-called "prima facie rule," given the
judicial imprimatur in 1633,'1 the King was held to have absolute
fee title to tide waters and tide-flowed lands with an unqualified
right to make such conveyances as he saw fit. 0 This largesse exer-
16. These prices and costs are at the margin. See generally Economics and Public Policy
in Water Resource Development (S. Smith & E. Castle ed. 1964).
17. Maloney & Ausness, supra note 1, at 198.
18. For the history and its philosophical impacts on modern thinking, see Comment,
supra note 1, at 763-74. It has been observed that the period of non-recognition of public rights
in the shore more or less coincided with a general loss in interest in commerce or other
activities which would have made such rights necessary to public convenience. Id. at 772-74.
19. Attorney-General v. Philpott, (1633) described in Attorney-General v. Chamberlaine,
70 Eng. Rep. 122, 123 (V. Ch. 1858).
20. See Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 198 N.Y. 287, 291, 91 N.E. 846,
[Vol. IV
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cised by the King on behalf of himself apparently was an important
factor in the Grand Remonstrance and uprisings which, in 1649,
brought the Stuart Dynasty (temporarily) and Charles I (perma-
nently) to an end.2 But even before, based upon some not-too-
compelling language of the Magna Charta, 2 time had been eroding
the absoluteness of the King's claim. Apparently among the earliest
public rights to achieve recognition were those of navigation and
fishery. 3 And the right to. navigate may have never been eclipsed. 4
The growth of commerce and other pressures to reopen shore uses
to the public had their evident influence upon judicial thinking, and
the trend of the law was to expand the public's right of use. As this
trend became clear, a theory was developed to take account of such
public rights of use. Known as the "public trust" doctrine, the
theory essentially was that the King, as owner of the soil beneath
the sea and its arms, held it subject to a trust for the protection of
the public and the public's acknowledged rights of use. 5 Moreover,
although conveyances of the King's ownership interest in underwa-
ter lands remained possible," the transferees would take subject to
the public trust.27
These ideas amounted to a bifurcation of the "absolute" title
which the sovereign held in shore lands subjected to the trust. On
one hand, there was the jus privatum, or private right, which a
person (sovereign, quasi-sovereign or private) could have with re-
spect to the soil itself, i.e., a fee title.28 On the other hand, there was
847 (1910); Maloney & Ausness, supra note 1, at 198-202.
21. See Town of Smithtown v. Poveromo, 71 Misc. 2d 524, 336 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Dist. Ct.
1972), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., People v. Poveromo, 79 Misc. 2d 42, 359 N.Y.S.2d
848 (2d Dep't 1973); Parsons, Public and Private Rights in the Foreshore, 22 COLUM. L. REV.
706, 708 (1922) [hereinafter cited as Parsons].
22. One commentator has traced the manner in which obviously teleological judicial
reasoning "expanded the Magna Charta almost unrecognizably over the years." Comment,
supra note 1, at 765-68.
23. Parsons, supra note 21, at 708; see Blundell v. Catterall, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (K.B.
1821).
24. Comment, supra note 1, at 781-82.
25. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 198 N.Y. 287, 91 N.E. 846 (1910);
Teclaff, The Coastal Zone-Control Over Encroachments into the Tidewaters, 1 J. MARITIME
L. & COMMERCE 241, 263 (1970).
26. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 424-27 (1842); People ex rel. Howell v.
Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 54 N.E. 682 (1899); People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287 (1863).
27. Blundell v. Catterall, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (K.B. 1821).
28. Id.
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the jus publicum, or public rights of use, which could be enjoyed by
persons at large despite the fact that the jus privatum may have
rested in other hands. 9 The jus publicum (as a public right of use
held in trust by the sovereign or its appropriate assignees) 0 was a
kind of easement or incorporeal interest which could exist simulta-
neously with, and be a burden upon, the private fee title (jus
privatum) held by another.'
As has been previously stated, the King's jus privatum or fee title
could be32 and often was conveyed. Conveyances of the jus
publicum, however, were apparently severely circumscribed,3 with
public bodies or representatives probably being the only eligible
takers.' The reason for the distinction is obvious: whereas the jus
29. People v. New York & S.I. Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 76 (1877); People v. Vanderbilt, 26
N.Y. 287, 292-93 (1863).
30. E.g., municipal corporations. Apparently, the King always had the power to delegate
his governmental powers to local governing bodies. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
367 (1842); In re Mayor of N.Y., 182 N.Y. 361, 75 N.E. 156 (1905); People ex rel. Howell v.
Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 54 N.E. 682 (1899). A similar power is of course recognized (within
Constitutional limits) for the states as successors to the King's sovereignity. Illinois Central
R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453-54 (1892); People ex rel. Howell v. Jessup, supra.
31. Although the burden of the jus publicum was made paramount to the residual fee
ownership rights of the private owner (i.e., the jus privatum) the absoluteness of the burden
as an interference with the fee owner's rights of private use was perhaps always less than the
burden of, say, an ordinary easement of way. In any event, the New York Court of Appeals
developed a sort of "reasonable user" test to permit the public's right of use to be to some
extent balanced against the private upland owner's interest in making meaningful use of his
own rights. Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 193 N.Y. 378, 85 N.E. 1093 (1908); Town
of Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N.Y. 74, 80 N.E. 665 (1907). In those cases, it was held that the
littoral (i.e., seaside) owner's right of access to the sea could be facilitated by permanent
structures extending over the tidelands despite the fact that such structures would inevitably
result in some impairment (albeit insubstantial) of passage by the public along the shore.
But the littoral owner was permitted to interfere with public passage "just so far as it was a
necessary consequence of the reasonable exercise" of the rights necessary to reasonable use
of the upland. Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., supra at 386, 85 N.E. at 1096. See also
Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 234 N.Y. 15, 136 N.E. 224 (1922).
32. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 424-27 (1842); People ex tel. Howell v.
Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 54 N.E. 682 (1899); People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287 (1863).
33. The question is complicated by the issue of whether parliamentary approval (or in the
new world, legislative approval) was necessary or even effective to validate particular grants.
See Comment, supra note 7, at 478-82; cf. Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton St. Realty Corp.,
272 N.Y. 292, 296-97, 5 N.E.2d 824, 825-26 (1936); Brookhaven v. Strong, 60 N.Y. 56 (1875).
34. Delegations to a municipality of the sovereign's power and property were (and are) to
be held by the recipient municipality in trust for the people, Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay,
234 N.Y. 15, 21, 136 N.E. 224, 225-26 (1922); People ex rel. Palmer v. Travis, 223 N.Y. 150,
119 N.E. 437 (1918); Town of Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N.Y. 74, 78, 80 N.E. 665, 666 (1907);
In re Mayor of N.Y., 182 N.Y. 361, 365-68, 75 N.E. 156, 158 (1905); DeLancey v. Piepgras,
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privatum belonged to the King in a more or less private proprietary
capacity-as much as any other property owner holds title to his
lands, the jus publicum was held as sovereign, on behalf of the
people generally, and thus should not be extinguishable by mere
unilateral act of the trustee.35 As an American court has said: "The
State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the
whole people are interested . . . than it can abdicate its police
powers .... "I'
These rights, powers and limitations of the English sovereign over
the shore lands were generally taken over in New York following the
Revolution. 7 The state became the successor to the King's interest
in crown lands,38 and the jus privatum in previously conveyed par-
cels39 and the jus pub licum in the shore generally were preserved. 0
138 N.Y. 26, 33 N.E. 822 (1893), and municipal powers over waters were always subject to
the sovereign power of the state, Knapp v. Fasbender, 1 N.Y.2d 212, 230.33, 134 N.E.2d 482,
491-93, 151 N.Y.S.2d 668, 681-85 (1956); People ex rel. Palmer v. Travis, supra; People v.
Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287 (1863), and not being contracts within the impairment of obligations
of contracts clause, such municipal powers are revocable at the pleasure of the state, Hunter
v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907); Demarest v. Mayor, 74 N.Y. 161, 167 (1878); cf.
In re Long Sault Dev. Co., 212 N.Y. 1, 10, 105 N.E. 849, 852 (1914).
Apparently, a municipality's property rights in water-lands, being held governmentally
"for public purposes ... to be administered for the public good," are similarly subject to
legislative modification and perhaps even extinction. People ex rel. Palmer v. Travis, supra
at 164-67, 119 N.E. at 442-43. This may be true despite the fact that other municipal lands,
if held in a proprietary capacity, may require compensation for taking. Id. Contra, Darlington
v. City of N.Y., 31 N.Y. 164 (1865).
35. See Parsons, supra note 21, at 715.
36. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
37. People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N.Y. 459, 473, 113 N.E. 521, 525 (1916); People
ex rel. Howell v. Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 257, 54 N.E. 682, 684 (1899); People v. New York &
S.I. Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 78 (1877); Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9 (1829); accord, Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842).
38. Roberts v. Baumgarten, 110 N.Y. 380, 383, 18 N.E. 96, 97 (1888); accord, Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1894). The "prima facie rule" that the King, and the state as his
successor, holds title prima facie to those sea and shore areas not previously granted to others
was initially recognized in People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287 (1863), but it was not without
hesitation, Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 193 N.Y. 378, 85 N.E. 1093 (1908); Town
of Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N.Y. 74, 80 N.E. 665 (1907); Parsons, supra note 21, that the
notion finally received a firm foothold in New York, People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218
N.Y. 459, 113 N.E. 521 (1916).
39. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 198 N.Y. 287, 291, 91 N.E. 846,
847 (1910); Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 193 N.Y. 378, 384, 85 N.E. 1093, 1096
(1908); People ex rel. Howell v. Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 257, 54 N.E. 682, 684 (1899); Sage v.
Mayor of N.Y., 154 N.Y. 61, 82-83, 47 N.E. 1096, 1102-03 (1897).
40. People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N.Y. 459, 479, 113 N.E. 521, 526 (1916); Lewis
Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 198 N.Y. 287, 291, 91 N.E. 846, 847 (1910); Sage
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Like the King, the state acquired the power to convey its right in
shore lands to private takers4 and to transfer the jus publicum to
appropriate public bodies,4" but it could not, in general, divest itself
of the jus publicum in favor of private persons." In fact, as inter-
v. Mayor of N.Y., 154 N.Y. 61, 82-83, 47 N.E. 1096, 1103 (1897); Trustees of Brookhaven v.
Strong, 60 N.Y. 56 (1875). Because of the federal government's power to regulate commerce
and navigation, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 the jus publicum was itself divided, the federal
government having paramount control within its sphere of constitutional jurisdiction, e.g. for
navigation. Greenleaf Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915); People v. Hudson River
Connecting R.R., 228 N.Y. 203, 219, 126 N.E. 801, 806 (1920); Lewis Blue Point Oyster
Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, supra.
41. People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N.Y. 459, 473, 113 N.E. 521, 524 (1916); People
v. New York & S.I. Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 78 (1877); Wetmore v. Brooklyn Gas Light Co., 42
N.Y. 384 (1870).
42. In re Mayor of N.Y., 182 N.Y. 361, 365, 75 N.E. 156, 157 (1905); People ex. rel. Howell
v. Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 257, 54 N.E. 682, 684 (1899); see Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 407,
39 N.E. 400, 402 (1895).
43. This is not to say that the jus pub licum may not, in certain instances, be cut down or
extinguished by grants of the jus privatum. See, e.g., People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218
N.Y. 459, 113 N.E. 521 (1916); Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 193 N.Y. 378, 85 N.E.
1093 (1908); People v. New York & S.I. Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71 (1877). And the state (or
municipal owners) may authorize the erection of private structures (e.g., a bridge) which
interfere to some degree with the public's right of use. People ex. rel. Howell v. Jessup, 160
N.Y. 249, 54 N.E. 682 (1899). Indeed, the court of appeals has gone so far as to say that:
The right [of the state] to grant the navigable waters is as absolute and uncontrollable
• . . as its right to grant the dry land which it owns. It holds all the public domain as
absolute owner, and is in no sense a trustee thereof, except as it is organized and
possesses all its property, functions and powers for the benefit of the people.
Langdon v. Mayor of N.Y., 93 N.Y. 129, 156 (1883).
However, holdings in later cases, recognizing the public purpose of the state's title as a
limitation on its power to convey, indicate that the statement just quoted cannot in its
extremity be taken as the law of New York. See, e.g., Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton St.
Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292, 5 N.E.2d 824 (1936); In re Long Sault Dev. Co., 212 N.Y. 1, 105
N.E. 849 (1914); Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 39 N.E. 400 (1895). Although the court of
appeals' decisions from the Revolution forward seem impossible to fully reconcile on this
point, a probably truer statement of the law is that, when the state grants underwater lands
to private persons, "the contemplated use ... must be reasonable and one which can fairly
be said to be for the public benefit or not injurious to the public." In re Long Sault Dev. Co.,
supra at 8, 105 N.E. at 852 (emphasis added).
Apparently, this power of the state to extinguish or cut down the jus publicum in favor of
private persons is a departure from the common law as it developed in England where, at
least as understood here, even the King and Parliament together were not competent to effect
such a result. Coxe v. State, supra at 406, 39 N.E. at 402, citing Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 367 (1842). On the other hand, the states' expanded power of disposition to private
persons, permitting extinction of the jus publicum, suggests the appropriateness of new
limitations of a different sort-either on the types of eligible grantees or on the uses for which
the grants may be made. Thus, grants for uses in furtherance of commerce are permissible,
e.g., Saunders v. New York Cent. & H.R.R.R., 144 N.Y. 75, 38 N.E. 992 (1894) (railroad
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preted in New York44 and elsewhere45 in this country, the interest in
preserving the public's rights was so strong that limitations were
imposed on transfers of the jus priva turn which were perhaps wholly
unjustifiable in light of the King's extensive power to convey. Al-
though grants of private ownership of the jus privatum (no matter
to whom, how extensive, or for what purposes) should theoretically
have no effect on the always paramount public rights of use,46 such
conveyances-especially if of large tracts47 of underwater
lands-have been held invalid by the courts where no public pur-
pose could be shown.48 And even with attempted conveyances of
smaller parcels of jus privatum, the courts have rather jealously
guarded the public interest. Although the "beneficial enjoyment" of
the fee may be granted in the case of such smaller conveyances, even
without a showing of public purpose, and even to the detriment of
the public's rights to use,49 it has been held that "the validity of the
conveyance turns on the degree to which the public interest will be
impaired . . . .,5 Moreover, in construing grants allegedly convey-
ingjus privatum, courts have employed a rule of strict construction,
holding that no interest in trust lands passes unless specific lan-
purposes), as are grants to the upland owner for beneficial enjoyment (i.e., almost unqualified
private use), e.g., People v. Steeplechase Park Co., supra, but grants to persons other than
upland owners for purely private purposes have been struck down, Marba Sea Bay Corp. v.
Clinton St. Realty Co., supra; Coxe v. State, supra; accord, Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387 (1892). And all such grants are probably subject to the limitation that the public
interest not be impaired as a result. Roe v. Strong, 107 N.Y. 350, 358, 14 N.E. 294, 296 (1887);
Riviera Ass'n v. North Hempstead, 52 Misc.2d 575, 276 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1967), opinion
adopted, Mannor Marine Realty Corp. v. Wachtler, 22 N.Y.2d 825, 239 N.E.2d 657, 292
N.Y.S.2d 918 (1968); see Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, supra at 452; In re Long Sault Dev.
Co., supra.
44. See note 43 supra.
45. E.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
46. Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 234 N.Y. 15, 20-21, 136 N.E. 224, 225 (1922); Lewis
Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 198 N.Y. 278, 91 N.E. 846 (1910); People v. New
York & S.I. Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 78 (1877).
47. For the effect of the size of the granted parcel as a factor limiting the state's power to
convey, see Teclaff, supra note 25, at 265-68. See also Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387 (1892).
48. Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton St. Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292, 5 N.E.2d 824 (1936);
Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 39 N.E. 400 (1895).
49. E.g., People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N.Y. 459, 113 N.E. 521 (1916); Wetmore
v. Brooklyn Gas Light Co., 42 N.Y. 384 (1870).
50. Riviera Ass'n v. North Hempstead, 52 Misc. 2d 575, 582, 276 N.Y.S.2d 249, 257 (Sup.
Ct. 1967), opinion adopted, Mannor Marine Realty Corp. v. Wachtler, 22 N.Y.2d 825, 239
N.E.2d 657, 292 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1968).
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guage of the conveyance shows the intention to convey them.5'
The reasons for imposing such restrictions on conveyances of jus
privatum are not entirely clear, although the failure of the courts
to carefully distinguish the private right from the public's rights
may be suggested as one explanation.2 Another explanation is that
the courts, contemplating the huge and unique shore land resources
still owned in fee by the public, came to regard even the fee
title-the jus privatum-as somewhat "affected by the public
interest." As such, the courts simply balked at the thought of whole-
sale divestiture of this public domain by a possible improvident
generation" which would thereby bind (in more ways than one) all
future generations. Furthermore, there is the fact that private own-
ers of the jus privatum can, by their use, effectively cut down or
even extinguish the jus publicum.54 In short, transfers of the jus
privatum and jus publicum were not carefully distinguished be-
cause they are not really entirely distinguishable.
In any event, we have reached the point today where the jus
publicum is not generally conveyable,55 but the jus privatum is con-
veyable subject to fairly stern limitations, both on the character and
the form of the conveyances.
Most of the judicial decisions to date in New York have concerned
themselves with the questions of which attempted state convey-
ances are permissible and with the rights which may be enjoyed
under the jus privatum and jus publicum respectively."6 Curiously,
comparatively little attention has been paid to the question of defin-
ing the upland limit of the shore lands subject to the public rights,
51. The existence of the trust for the public, and public inconvenience that can readily
result from conveyances of trust lands, see note 43 supra, are reasons for employing this rule
of strict construction against the grantee. Sage v. Mayor, 154 N.Y. 61, 79-81, 47 N.E. 1096,
1101-02 (1897). "In patents from sovereign to subject the rule of construction which controls
• . . is reversed and the terms are taken most strongly against the grantee, because the public
interest is involved." Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 198 N.Y. 287, 292,
91 N.E. 846, 847 (1910); accord, Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 10, 13 (1893). This rule of
construction applies to grants by municipalities as well. In re Mayor of N.Y., 182 N.Y. 361,
75 N.E. 156 (1905).
52. See Comment, supra note 7, at 478.
53. A measure of earlier improvidence is the name of the statute: "An Act for the Speedy
Sale of the Confiscated and Forfeited Estates within This State . ch. 64, [1777-87]
N.Y. Laws 127 (1784).
54. See note 43 supra.
55. But see note 43 supra.
56. See text accompanying notes 44-55 supra.
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i.e., how to determine the boundary between those lands which are
subject to the jus publicum and those which are not. Yet, because
of the entirely different methods of use allocation applicable in the
case of shore lands (as compared with inland territories),57 this ques-
tion would seem, in many cases, to be at least as crucial as the ones
which have so many times engaged the courts.
Actually, the problem of locating the boundary between shore and
upland has significance for at least two purposes. One, as just men-
tioned, is to determine the upland limit of the shore lands which are
subject to the public's right of use; i.e., defining the "servient tene-
ment" of the jus publicum. The other purpose is to locate the sea-
ward boundary of the parcels which, in instruments of conveyance,
are described as extending "to the sea" or by a like boundary desig-
nation.
There is no particular policy reason why the same line should be
used for both the upland boundary of the jus publicum and the
seaward boundary of parcels bounded "by the sea." In interpreting
the language used in grants of private interests, the ostensible object
of the inquiry is to ascertain the parties' (particularly the grantor's)
intent." Subject only to limitations on the grantor's estate or power
to convey, it is that intention which controls the extent of his trans-
fer. On the other hand, in setting the upland boundaries of lands
subject to the jus publicum, the courts are essentially making a
policy determination, i.e., which lands are subject to what mode of
use-allocation," a question of law in which private intentions play
no role. Nonetheless, for reasons which seem largely historical, the
rule of construction for grants extending "to the sea" has been held
to result in the same boundary line as the line which, by law, defines
the upland limits of the jus publicum. ° In the case of both, the line
57. That is, the use of inland territories is allocated by private purchases and sales of
rights to use and/or to possess, whereas use of shore lands is allocated, to a substantial degree,
by recognition of rights to use as belonging to the public generally. See text accompanying
notes 8-17 supra.
58. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 240(3) (McKinney 1968). 15 N.Y. JUR. Deeds § 13 (rev. 1972).
59. L e., use-allocation by purchases and sales of private rights of use versus use-allocation
(to a substantial degree) by recognizing rights to use as belonging to the public generally. See
text accompanying notes 8-17 supra.
60. The rule of construction for grants extending "to the sea" seems to have resulted from
a failure to distinguish the King's title by jus privatum from his title by jus pub licum. Thus,
in the construction of royal grants of sea-side lands, the assumption was made that the King
did not intend to part with tidal lands held as sovereign. The confusion of jus publicum and
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is the "high water" line.6'
As a rule of construction, and as a rule of law delineating the limit
of the public's right of use, the "high water" line rule is not without
jus privatum was understandable in earlier times, prior to the recognition of public trust
notion of jus publicum, inasmuch as the King's claim to tidal lands was apparently a claim
to a private personal right. See Comment, supra note 1, at 764-5, 768-9. When the public trust
ofjus publicum was later seen as qualifying this private right of the King (somewhere between
the Magna Charta and the 17th century), the tendency to confuse the private right of the
King (and his grantees of shore lands) with the sovereign title held for the public (jus
publicum) apparently persisted, and this confusion continued to cloud such issues as
whether, for example, particular grants required parliamentary ratification to be valid. Id.
See also Town of Brookhaven v. Strong, 60 N.Y. 56 (1875); Comment, supra note 7, at 478-
82. American cases often continued this tradition, muddying the distinction between trans-
fers of the private right and of the jus publicum, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387 (1892); Martin v. Waddel, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842); Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 39
N.E. 400 (1895), so that even after it became accepted that thejus privatum was transferable
(subject to the jus publicum), the holding and transfer of the jus privatum was still hobbled
by ideas of "public good" wholly unrelated to the private interest involved. See, e.g., Tiffany
v. Town of Oyster Bay, 234 N.Y. 15, 21, 136 N.E. 224, 225 (1922); In re Long Sault Dev. Co.,
212 N.Y. 1,105 N.E. 849 (1914). Consequently, even though in theory the separate recognition
of the jus publicum interest should have "liberated" the jus privatum for the freest possible
transfer and enjoyment (subject only to the jus publicum itself), it has not had that effect.
See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1894). The presumption that, absent clear intent,
grants extending "to the sea" stop at the mean high water line, see note 51 supra and note
61 infra, and the limitations imposed on, for example, massive transfers of thejus privatum
in shore lands, see, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, supra; Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton
St. Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292, 5 N.E.2d 824 (1936); Coxe v. State, supra, are manifestations
of this historical confusion. Perhaps courts have refused to distinguish the private right from
the public rights because even the private right is sufficiently affected with a public interest
to justify limiting its free alienation. Because transferees of the private right can, by their
use, cut down or extinguish the jus publicum, the limitations on free alienation would seem
to be in any event an appropriate policy compromise. See note 43 supra and accompanying
text.
61. Examples of cases holding that the shore subject to the jus publicum extends to the
"high water" or "mean high water" line are Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Schultz, 116 N.Y. 382,
388, 22 N.E. 564, 565 (1889); Tucci v. Salzhauer, 40 App. Div. 2d 712, 336 N.Y.S.2d 721 (2d
Dep't 1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 854, 307 N.E.2d 256, 352 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1973); accord, Shively
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 12 (1894).
Examples of cases holding that grants extending "to the sea" or similarly described pre-
sumptively go only to the "high water" or "mean high water" line are Marba Sea Bay Corp.
v. Clinton St. Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292, 5 N.E.2d 824 (1936); Tiffany v. Town of Oyster
Bay, 209 N.Y. 1, 9, 102 N.E. 585, 587 (1913); In re Mayor of N.Y., 182 N.Y. 361, 75 N.E. 156
(1905); Sage v. Mayor, 154 N.Y. 61, 69, 47 N.E. 1096, 1097 (1897); Delancy v. Piepgras, 138
N.Y. 26, 36, 33 N.E. 822, 824 (1893).
In the interest of simplicity and in accordance with the object of this Article only New York
cases or cases consistent with the New York view have been cited above. A minority of states
have not followed the English common law (and New York) rule of setting the shore boundary
at high water. See Maloney & Ausness, supra note 1, -at 200-02.
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its drawbacks. The sea is simply not compliant enough to cast its
waters, even its high tidal waters, to any definite line. Even ignoring
the action of the waves, which create a line that moves from instant
to instant, the tides themselves exhibit a lack of consistency, with
variations from tide to tide, season to season and year to year.2 As
a natural monument for land description purposes, the sea hardly
offers the certainty of results provided by, say, an ancient oak. And
this is not to mention the sea-edge variations that occur due to the
effects of erosion and accretion on the profile of the shore. 3 In sum,
62. The formulation of a serviceable definition in light of this tidal variation was the
subject of an extended discussion by the Supreme Court in Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los
Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 21-27 (1935). The Court observed that in England a considerable
measure of indefiniteness had been removed from the "high water line" formulation by
confining the reference to "the flux and reflux of the sea at ordinary tides." Id. at 22, quoting
Blundell v. Catterall, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190, 1199 (1821). Thus, for purposes of fixing bounda-
ries, the so-called "spring" tides (unusually high tides which happen twice a month) and
"high spring tides" (which happen at the equinoxials) are not controlling, nor are the so-
called "neap" tides (unusually low tides) taken as a reference. Instead, the Supreme Court
accepted a "mean high water line" standard and the definition of the United States Coast
and Geodetic Survey (now called the National Ocean Survey) that "mean high water at any
place is the average height of all the high waters at that place over a considerable period of
time." 296 U.S. at 26-27. Theoretically, based on the movements and relative positions of the
sun, moon, and earth, the tidal variations repeat themselves in cycles of approximately 18.6
years; therefore, to fix the mean high water line as'accurately as possible, "an average of 18.6
years should be determined .... " Id. at 27. For a complete discussion of tidal variations
and their legal consequences see Maloney & Ausness, supra note 1.
Although in most New York decisions the courts have seemed content to refer simply to
the "high water line" as the determinant without further specification, prior to Dolphin Lane
Associates, Ltd. v. Town of Southampton, 37 N.Y.2d 292, 333 N.E.2d 358, 372 N.Y.S.2d 52
(1975), the standard appeared to be the "mean" or "ordinary" high water line in this state
as well. See Dunham v. Townshend, 118 N.Y. 281, 287, 23 N.E. 367, 368 (1890) ("The
important question was . . . where ordinary high water mark was .... ); Gucker v. Town
of Huntington, 254 App. Div. 10, 12-13, 3 N.Y.S.2d 788, 790-91 (2d Dep't 1938) (mean high
water mark); Rockaway Park Imp. Co., Ltd. v. City of New York, 140 App. Div. 160, 124
N.Y.S. 1096 (2d Dep't 1910); 33 N.Y. STATE DEP'T REP. 415, 421 (1925) (mean high water
mark). See also State v. Bishop, 46 App. Div. 2d 654, 359 N.Y.S.2d 817 (2d Dep't 1974); Town
of Smithtown v. Poveromo, 71 Misc. 2d 524, 336 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Dist Ct. 1972), rev 'd on other
grounds sub nor., People v. Poveromo, 79 Misc. 2d 42, 359 N.Y.S.2d 848 (2d Dep't 1973).
References herein to "high water" or "high water line" are meant to refer to ordinary or
mean high water. It is to be observed, however, that no matter what meaning may be attrib-
uted to the words "high water line" as used by New York courts in the past, there is no
indication that the reference was to vegetation lines or any other physical existence other than
the intersections of the shores by the tidal planes.
63. In general, where upland area is lost due to erosion of the shore, title to the area eroded
away is likewise lost to the neighboring (seaward) owner. Correspondingly, additions to the
upland by accretion accrue to the upland owner to the detriment of the seaward estate. Both
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the "high water" line, as a real estate boundary, is not a line at all
but merely a linguistic formulation. And as such, it is scarcely more
definite than the concept, "the edge of the sea," which it is supposed
to define. About the only contribution that the "high water line"
formulation makes to our understanding of the boundary location
is to tell us that the division between upland and sea lies toward the
landward, not the seaward, of the area of tidal wash. Since defining
the sea-boundary in terms of a water-line does not get the line-
drawers very far, it was inevitable that someone some day would ask
the courts: "Where is the high water line?" Apparently the first
definitive judicial resolution on this point in New York is the court
of appeals' decision in Dolphin Lane Associates, Ltd. v. Town of
Southampton," decided in mid-1975.
In Dolphin Lane the issue was the boundary between private
uplands and the non-privately owned lands 5 under Shinnecock
Bay, a tidal body of water.6 According to the court of appeals, no
one "seriously disputed" that the high-water line was the bound-
ary.67 What was disputed was the "method or proof by which the
high-water mark shall be precisely located on the land.""6 The court
rejected reliance on hydrographic data" propounded as a scientific
method for establishing the actual "high-water" line. Instead it
decided that the high-water mark should be located on the ground
of these general rules must be qualified by doctrines such as avulsion and reliction and by
the principle that shore profile changes which are artificially made or induced do not affect
the location of boundaries. See Maloney & Ausness, supra note 1, at 224-27.
64. 37 N.Y.2d 292, 333 N.E.2d 358, 372 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1975).
65. Title to the lands under the body of water in question, Shinnecock Bay, was held for
the Town of Southampton by the Trustees of the Freeholders and the Commonalty of the
Town of Southampton. For the origin of the titles at issue, see note 76 infra.
66. One of the contested issues in the case was whether Shinnecock Bay was in fact tidal
throughout the relevant history or only since 1938, when a powerful hurricane carved the
Shinnecock Inlet from the sea-an inlet which has been preserved in the interim by artificial
means. Brief for Appellant at 24-38, Dolphin Lane Associates, Ltd. v. Town of Southampton,
37 N.Y.2d 292, 333 N.E.2d 358, 372 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1975). Also questioned was whether the
artificial maintenance of the inlet channel, and hence of tidal variations, could have an effect
on titles and boundaries originating in non-tidal times. Id.; Brief for New York State Land
Title Association as Amicus Curiae at 26-31. However, in light of its decision, the court of
appeals did not reach these issues, and the result in this case as it may have been affected
by these contentions is not here under discussion.
67. 37 N.Y.2d at 295, 333 N.E.2d at 359, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
68. Id.
69. .e., data as to the actual level of the tides over a period of time.
(Vol. IV
"HIGH WATER" MARK
"by reference to the line of vegetation." 0 The court of appeals de-
scribed its method for fixing the high-water line as "the application
of the traditional and customary method by which that verbal for-
mulation [high water line] has been put in practice in the past to
locate the boundary line along the shore."' Thus, the court pur-
ported to protect "the expectations of the parties" and to avoid
introducing into the law of conveyancing an "element of uncertainty
and unpredictability" that resort to science, as a dynamic body of
understanding, would possibly bring."
The amount of certainty and predictability that the court's deci-
sion adds to the law of conveyancing is problematical, considering
the unpredictable nature of the line in question in the first place.
What is more certain, however, is that by its decision the court of
appeals has established a line of "high water" which one must go
wading to see.
The action in Dolphin Lane was originally brought by the upland
waterfront owner to have certain zoning ordinances of the Town of
Southampton declared unconstitutional. 3 The town 4 responded to
this attack on its ordinances with a counterclaim in which it as-
serted a superior title to parts of the lands affected by the zoning. 5
The lands claimed by the town were essentially those between the
usually dry upland and the open water. It was this controversy as
to title that was before the court of appeals.
The title dispute came down to a dispute over the location of the
boundary line between the town's lands (mostly underwater) and
the private plaintiff's lands (upland extending to the water). At the
trial level, the court concluded that the original governmental
conveyances under which plaintiff claimed"5 extended only to the
70. 37 N.Y.2d at 298, 333 N.E.2d at 360, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
71. Id. at 296, 333 N.E.2d at 359, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
72. Id.
73. 72 Misc. 2d 868, 869, 339 N.Y.S.2d 966, 968 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 43 App. Div. 2d
727, 351 N.Y.S.2d 364 (2d Dep't. 1973), modified, 37 N.Y.2d 292, 333 N.E.2d 358, 372
N.Y.S.2d 52 (1975).
74. The Trustees of the Freeholders and Commonalty of Southampton intervened and
joined in the counterclaim. Id. For convenience, except where the distinction between the two
is pertinent, the trustees and the town will be hereinafter referred to as the Town.
75. Id. at 869-70, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 968-69.
76. According to Town of Southampton v. Mecox Bay Oyster Co., 116 N.Y. 1, 8, 22 N.E.
387, 389 (1889) titles in the Town of Southampton are derived from the grant by the King to
the Duke of York and the royal charters issued under his government. In 1676 Governor
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Andross gave a charter to the inhabitants of what is now the town, granting to them, within
the bounds of the town, "[a]ll of the afore mentioned Tract of Land . . . Together with all
Rivers, Lakes, waters Quarrys Wood land Plaines Meadows, pastures, Marshes. ifishing
Hawking Hunting and ffowling." Gov. Andross' Patent of South Hampton (1676) reprinted
in 2 TOWN TRUSTEES RECORDS OF THE TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON 379, 380 [hereinafter cited as
TOWN RECORDS].
Ten years later, in 1686, Governor Dongan gave a second charter, the so-called "Dongan
patent," which recited Andross' charter, and which granted, ratified, and confirmed to the
"ffreeholders & Inhabitants of Southampton heerin after erected and made one body Corpo-
rate and Politique and willed and determined to be called by the name of the trustees of the
ffreeholders and commonalty of the Towne of southampton and their Successors all the afore
recited tracts & necks of land . . . marshes swamps plaines Rivers Rivolets waters lakes
ponds Brooks streames beaches . . . harbours . . . fishing hawking hunting fowling ....
Gov. Dongan Patent of Southampton (1686), reprinted in TOWN RECORDS 385, 388.
The Dongan patent stipulated that "appropriated" (i.e. occupied) lands were transferred
"to the .. use" of the respective occupants and their heirs. TowN RECORDS 389. This use
was apparently executed by the Statute of Uses. Unappropriated lands were transferred "to
the use . . . of such as have been purchasers thereof. . . made as tenants in Common .. "
Id. This use was not executed (presumably because it was an "active" use) and the legal title
to the unappropriated lands was accordingly held by the town (with power of sale) for the
benefit of the persons who had acquired the same by earlier conveyance, seemingly the
Andross patent. These purchasers who thus acquired an equitable interest in the unappro-
priated lands became known as the "proprietors" and apparently were the successors of the
original settlers. See 72 Misc. 2d at 873, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
Although the Dongan patent itself was quite indistinct on the point, the court of appeals
has since held that the proprietors' equitable interest existed only with respect to the (unap-
propriated) uplands, and the proprietors had no interest in the lands under the water. Town
of Southampton v. Mecox Bay Oyster Co., supra. With respect to the lands under water, the
town acquired title in its governmental capacity with the full authority to do whatever would
inure to the benefit of the inhabitants. See People ex rel. Howell v. Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249,
262, 54 N.E. 682, 686 (1899).
In 1818, in accordance with a compromise worked out between the town and the proprie-
tors, the state legislature enacted a statute which transferred management of the remaining
unallocated lands to trustees of the proprietors. Act of April 15, 1818, ch. 155, [18181 N.Y.
Laws 140. This divested the town of legal title to such lands and substituted a private trust
arrangement for the trusteeship which had been theretofore held by the town. However,
management of the waters was reserved to the town under the 1818 enactment, and this "sole
control" was reconfirmed in a subsequent enactment. Act of April 25, 1831, ch. 283, [1831]
N.Y. Laws 352.
From the foregoing it may be observed that all private titles in Southampton are traceable
to grants either: (1) from freeholders who held appropriated lands at the time of the Dongan
patent; (2) from the town acting as trustee for the proprietors; (3) from the trustees of the
proprietors, who succeeded the town as trustees under the law of 1818. The plaintiff in
Dolphin Lane traced its title to the trustees of the proprietors.
The original governmental conveyances would have been the Dongan patent and (though
not a conveyance in the strict sense) the law of 1818, conveying legal title first to the town
(as trustee) and then to the trustees of the proprietors. It was these conveyances (or, more
precisely, the former as confirmed by the latter) that created the boundary; by creating an
equitable interest in the upland that did not apply to the water lands, these conveyances
effected a severance of the two. See note 88 infra.
For additional discussion of the title history, including a description of events in the pre-
Andross patent period, see 72 Misc. 2d at 870-81, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 969-75.
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high water line." The trial court then proceeded to describe a practi-
cal method for locating this line.
Essentially, the trial court observed that natural growths of two
types of marsh grasses predominated in the area in question. One
type, Spartina alterniflora (cordgrass), thrives naturally only if in-
undated twice daily by the tides. The other type of grass, Spartina
patens (salt hay), thrives only in areas beyond the reach of the
twice-daily tidal inundations.78 In the intermediate strip between
the "colonies" of these two types of grasses, both are found growing,
but neither grows vigorously. The natural characteristics and
growth patterns of these two grass types were accepted by the trial
court as evidence of the -location of the water line.79 The court did
not hold that these plants fixed the boundary as a matter of law but
only that their growth was "indicative of the tidal flow for all the
months of the year, over the course of several years."80 Accordingly,
the line was to be in the intermediate strip between the primary
growth areas of the two types of grass.
The court of appeals rejected the type-of-grass "test"8' and, as
previously stated, held that the high water line should be located
by reference to the line of vegetation. Although it described the trial
court's methodology as "independent," ."novel," and "intellectually
fascinating," the court argued that the result below would have
significantly changed the on-the-site line and thus "do violence to
the expectations of the parties and introduce factors never reasona-
bly within their contemplation.""2
Certainly the court of appeals' objective to avoid these horribles
is commendable even if in the process a swipe must be taken at
groping science which, in a most untrustworthy fashion, "may one
day [replace] . . . [the type of grass test] by an even more sophis-
77. 72 Misc. 2d at 882, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 981, citing Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 209
N.Y. 1, 102 N.E. 585 (1922).
78. However, the areas in which Spartina patens grows may be subject to flooding by so-
called "spring" tides which occur twice each month. See note 62 supra.
79. See 72 Misc. 2d at 885-86, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 984-85.
80. Id. The appellate division affirmed without opinion. 43 App. Div. 2d 727, 351
N.Y.S.2d 364 (2d Dep't 1973).
81. Although referred to as a "type-of-grass test" by the court of appeals, the method of
the trial did not involve the use of a "test" at all; the trial court simply recognized the
relevance of growth patterns as evidence. 72 Misc. 2d at 885-86, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 984-85.
82. 37 N.Y. 2d at 296, 333 N.E.2d at 359, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
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ticated and refined test ..... "1 Nonetheless, it is difficult to see
how anyone's "expectations" can be disappointed if the term "high
water line" is deemed to mean a line which represents, according
to the best available information, the upper (average) reach of the
high water. It seems, in any case, to do more violence to expecta-
tions-speaking strictly as laymen in hydrography-to place the
"high water line" so far out in the bay that, even at mid to low tide,
a person would have to wear galoshes in order to walk to the line in
comfort. Yet, this is precisely what the court of appeals has done.
By locating the line at the seaward edge of the Spartina alterniflora,
a plant which needs tidal inundation twice-daily, the court of ap-
peals has set the high water line on the bottom of the bay.84
How could the court of appeals reach such a result?
Fundamentally, the task of the court in Dolphin Lane was to
adjudicate the boundary line between two adjacent landowners-a
question of essentially a factual nature rather than one of law.85 In
principle, boundaries are established either by intention or conduct.
Usually, it is intention which controls, meaning the intention of the
grantor who originally created the boundary by severing a larger
parcel into the smaller parcels which the boundary separates. Nor-
mally, the inquiry into the grantor's intention is limited to an inter-
pretation of the expression thereof in the instrument of conveyance.
However, the interpretation of instruments of conveyance, espe-
cially if ambiguous, may be assisted by reference to extrinsic
facts-the conduct of the parties (or perhaps also their successors
in interest) being an important source of such interpretative assis-
83. Id. (emphasis added). For the contrary view, that resort to science presumptively
fosters certainty and not unpredictability, see Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts,
66 COLUM. L. REv. 1080, 1096 (1966).
84. Slightly less hyperbolically, the court of appeals has probably in effect fixed the "high
water line" at the low water line, since Spartina alterniflora is apparently not a water plant
living in areas continuously under water. It would be totally baffling to set any sort of water
line by reference to a line of vegetation if the plants in question could grow throughout the
shallows of the bay.
85. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra. It may not have been a question of fact in
the sense that its resolution should be left to the jury, of course. Compare People v. Hillman,
246 N.Y. 467, 159 N.E. 400 (1927) with Town of North Hempstead v. Oelsner, 148 App. Div.
779, 133 N.Y.S. 319 (2d Dep't 1912). However, even though the interpretation of instruments
is generally left to the court, the basic issue-as to the parties' intentions-is essentially a
factual one. By way of contrast, establishing a principle for fixing the limits of lands subject
to the jus publicum would be purely a question of law.
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tance.8 6 In addition, the location of boundaries may be affected by
conduct when, for example, a landowner acquires an adjacent por-
tion of his neighbor's lands by adverse possession. 7 Thus, although
the location of boundaries is normally determined according to the
original grantor's manifested intention, conduct amounting to ad-
verse possession or showing a more definite intention can influence
the determination.
In Dolphin Lane, the disputed boundary had to be located by
interpreting the original instruments severing the upland territory
from the lands under water,8 subject to the possibility that the
boundary as originally established may have been relocated by ad-
verse possession or an analogous theory.
The history of titles in the Town of Southampton is long and
relatively complex; 8 however, for present purposes it is sufficient to
note that, under the relevant grants, the lands under water ° belong
to the town whereas the uplands were granted either to the town (as
to unallocated lands)8 ' or to their respective occupants (of already
appropriated tracts). 2 The uplands involved in Dolphin Lane ap-
86. White v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 254 N.Y. 152, 172 N.E. 452 (1930). See also Hill v.
Priestly, 52 N.Y. 635 (1873); French v. Carhart, 1 N.Y. 96 (1847); cf. Town of Southampton
v. Mecox Bay Oyster Co., 116 N.Y. 1, 22 N.E. 387 (1889); Brookhaven v. Strong, 60 N.Y. 56
(1875); Pettit v. Shepard, 32 N.Y. 97 (1865); 15 N.Y. JUR., Deeds § 73 (rev. 1972).
87. If a boundary is agreed between parties and improvements are made in reliance
thereon, another basis for recognizing the shifted boundary, estoppel in pais, may exist. See
Baldwin v. Brown, 16 N.Y. 359, 364 (1857); Bell v. Hayes, 60 App. Div. 382, 385, 69 N.Y.S.
898, 900 (2d Dep't 1901).
88. In this case, the line was created when the Dongan patent was delivered since it is
under that patent that the town claims its title to the waterlands and the private owners, as
successors to the "proprietors," claim title to the uplands. Even though, with respect to these
particular uplands, the Dongan patent effected no severance of legal title (since the town
received both the waterlands, legally and beneficially, and the uplands, subject to the equita-
ble interest of the proprietors), that patent nonetheless effected a severance as to the
equitable title. See note 76 supra. It has already been held that the proprietors and their
trustees received no interest in or power to convey the waterlands either under the patent or
under the subsequent confirmatory legislation. Town of Southampton v. Mecox Bay Oyster
Co., 116 N.Y. 1, 22 N.E. 387 (1889). Therefore, it is the boundary line created by the Dongan
patent delivered in 1686 that is controlling unless subsequent conduct or events have moved
the line.
89. See note 76 supra.
90. Under the apparently dispositive grant, the Dongan patent of 1686, the town (through
its trustees) received the "Rivers Rivolets waters, ponds Brooks streames, beaches ... har-
bours . . . ." ToWN RECORDs 388. See notes 76, 88 supra.
91. These were subject to certain equitable rights of the so-called "proprietors" who were,
it appears, successors of the original settlers. See note 76 supra.
92. The court in Town of Southampton v. Mecox Bay Oyster Co., 116 N.Y. 1, 15, 22 N.E.
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parently remained unallocated until 1861,11 so it was not until then
that the boundary between these uplands and the town lands under
water became important. By a deed delivered in 1861, the Dolphin
Lane plaintiff's predecessor in interest received a parcel of unallo-
cated upland described as "bounded . . .on the north by Shinne-
cock Bay."94 The division between waterlands of the bay and up-
lands now became relevant and, as previously noted95 the court of
appeals in Dolphin Lane accepted the traditional rule of construc-
tion in New York that. the dividing line is the line of high water.
In giving more specific definitional content to the term "high
water line" the court of appeals had several choices. It could adhere
to a literal definition, requiring recourse to hydrographic data, over
a period of time, showing the action of the tides. If recourse to
hydrographic data were deemed too cumbersome, it could use a
"burden-of-proof" methodology: any relevant evidence tending to
show the line would be considered, and the proponent of a particular
on-the-site line would have responsibility for supplying sufficient
proof. 7 Or the court could establish a "test" whereby some fact
more susceptible to convenient proof (e.g., the line of vegetation) is
"deemed" to be the line of high water. The last-named approach,
that of establishing a "test," is the approach selected by the Court.
In evaluating the appropriateness of a judicial "test," the perti-
nent inquiries would seem to be (i) the convenience of the test, and
(ii) the validity of the test. That is, when the courts decide cases
on the basis of proofs other than of the fundamentally operative
387, 391 (1889) denied that the private "proprietors" had any power to make grants with
respect to lands under the waters.
93. Actually, this deed was not delivered by the town but by the trustees of the proprietors
who had succeeded, under legislative enactment, to the management of the unallocated
lands. Act of April 15, 1818, ch. 155, [1818] N.Y. Laws 140. This management continued to
be for the benefit of those who had equitable rights therein. See note 76, 88 supra.
94. 72 Misc. 2d at 873, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 973. This portion of the grant was confirmed by
quitclaim deed by the town in 1899. Id. at 874, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
95. See text accompanying notes 65-72 supra.
96. See note 62 supra. This was the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Borax
Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935). The Borax case involved the extent of lands
held under a federal grant, and accordingly, the question was decided as a matter of federal
law. However, where no federal grants or interests are involved (as would be generally the
case along the eastern seaboard, less so in the west), federal law defining the high water line
is not binding on the states. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893). But see notes 160, 178 infra.
97. This was apparently the approach of the trial court in Dolphin Lane. See text ac-
companying notes 78-80 supra.
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facts, the substituted proofs should not only be easier than proof of
the fundamental facts, they should also tend to show the existence
(or not) of the real operative facts with a fairly high degree of relia-
bility. Thus, to be an appropriate test, the "line of vegetation" test
adopted by the court of appeals should not only be easier to prove
than the actual high water line (which it is);"s it should also gener-
ally correspond with that line. The lack of correspondency between
the two lines under circumstances of Dolphin Lane raises a serious
question as to the appropriateness of the test.9
Even if a judicial test does fall short of satisfying the criterion of
validity or reliability, it still might be appropriate to apply the test,
subject to rebuttal, if using the test greatly simplifies matters of
proof compared with the proof of the "real" operative fact at issue.
And, of course, proving the line of vegetation is much simpler than
proof, by resort to hydrographic data over a long period, of the
actual high water line.'00 However, in the case of such less-than-
reliable tests, it should at least be open to the litigants to show, by
reference to more reliable data, that the true state of facts is other
than what the "test" would indicate. That is, unless the test in
question is very reliable indeed, it should at most operate as a re-
buttable presumption, yielding to reality in cases where the pre-
sumption proves to be erroneous. But the court of appeals appears
to have established its line of vegetation test not as a rule of con-
struction, not as a rebuttable presumption of intent; the court made
its test a rule of property, 10 which can stand stubbornly against all
98. Using hydrographic data to fix the actual high line, as the Supreme Court approved
in Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935), would require observations over a
period of 18.6 years in order to be precise. See note 62 supra.
99. In the area in question, one of the important vegetation types was Spartina alterni-
flora, a species requiring twice-daily tidal inundation to thrive. That being the case, it is
hard to see how the seaward line of this vegetation could possibly correspond to the high
water line. It is even hard to see how evidence of the seaward line of this growth could be
relevant evidence of the high water line. On the other hand, the landward limit of this type
of vegetation would seem to be very probative of the location of the actual high water line. It
was evidence of this landward limit which was accepted as evidence by the trial court and
rejected by the court of appeals.
100. See note 98 supra.
101. The court stated:
The controlling principle here is that which we wrote in Heyert v. Orange and Rock-
land Utilities (17 N.Y.2d 352, 363): "Whatever the rule might be if this were a case of
first impression, it is certain that thousands of deeds. . . have been made on this rule
.... It has ripened into a rule of property .... "
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the truth and reality which the processes of proof can pose against
it.102
In fact, the court adopted the line of vegetation test as a rule
fixing the "high water line" entirely without reference to its reliabil-
ity as an indicator of the real high water line-the ostensible histori-
cal boundary. At the same time, the court pointed to the "import-
ance of stability and predictability in matters involving title"1 °" as
the reason for its holding. If there is an apparent conflict between
what the court did and its reason for doing it, the conflict may be
resolved, at least for the specific factual context of Dolphin Lane,
by reference to the specific background of that case.
It appears that for many years it had been the normal practice of
local surveyors to locate the high water line by reference to the line
of vegetation." 4 Furthermore, title insurers claimed to have been
insuring titles to shore areas on the basis of these surveys'"5 and a
succession of purchasers may have taken titles based thereon. Thus,
it was to protect the expectations generated by local surveying tech-
niques that the court of appeals decided to define the high water line
by "the application of the traditional and customary method by
37 N.Y.2d at 297, 333 N.E.2d at 360, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 55 (emphasis added). It is a question
whether a rule of construction must be "ripened" into a rule of property in order to give the
law's protection to justified reliance thereon. Nonetheless, the court of appeals clearly chose
to treat the line-of-vegetation rule as so ripened.
102. By way of contrast, the Supreme Court of Alaska recognized a substituted high water
line (a so-called "meander line") as only presumptive evidence of the boundary for title
purposes in Hawkins v. Alaska Freight Lines, Inc., 410 P.2d 992 (Alas. 1966), where the real
high water line was obscured by vegetation. The court thus managed to solve the practical
problem of proof in a specific case without forever relinquishing the state's title to tideland
areas. In general, absent clear intent, such lines are not taken as the boundary, and the actual
high water line controls. See Maloney & Ausness, supra note 1, at 253.
103. 37 N.Y.2d at 296, 333 N.E.2d at 359, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
104. 37 N.Y.2d at 297, 333 N.E.2d at 360, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 54. It may be seriously argued
that this practice of surveyors was followed only in cases where the survey was for purposes
other than locating the boundary at the shore. See note 142 infra. Historically, both surveyors
and the court of appeals recognized the distinction between the high water line and the edge
of the marshlands, and that the former was controlling in boundary disputes. Dunham v.
Townshend, 118 N.Y. 281, 23 N.E. 367 (1890). It does not seem reasonable to assume that
there was a discrepancy between surveying practice and a clear line of decisions, going back
at least to 1890, holding that the line of high water is the boundary. Id.; see additional cases
at note 140 infra. Nonetheless, the court of appeals in Dolphin Lane seems to have assumed
that such a discrepancy did exist.
105. See Brief for New York State Land Title Association as Amicus Curiae at 4, Dolphin
Lane Associates, Ltd. v. Town of Southampton, 37 N.Y.2d 292, 333 N.E.2d 358, 372 N.Y.S.2d
52.
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which that verbal formulation had been put in practice in the past
to locate the boundary line along the shore."'' 0 Irrespective of
whether the surveyor's long-standing practice was originally correct
or incorrect, its persistence through the years, as the de facto norm
on boundary questions, has therefore made it law. 07
By attaching legal significance to surveying practice irrespective
of whether that practice was originally correct or incorrect, the court
has admitted the possibility that the boundary line, as apparently
intended by the original severing grantor, 08 may have been moved
by subsequent conduct and events.' When the line is so moved, an
apparent expropriation of one landowner and a corresponding vest-
ing in his neighbor must occur. At this point two questions are
raised: How can the apparent expropriation involved in moving the
line be justified? And even if moving the line is justified in this case,
is it appropriate to elevate the line-of-vegetation test to a rule of
property?
As already noted,"0 both adverse possession and "practical loca-
tion""' are events or conduct which may justify locating the bound-
ary at a place other than that which would be indicated by the
grantor's manifest intention as expressed in the instrument of con-
106. 37 N.Y.2d at 296, 333 N.E.2d at 359, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
107. The court stated:
To give effect to such uniform practice is not, as the town contends, to delegate
arbitrary powers to surveyors to determine property lines; rather it is the obverse,
namely, to recognize that property lines are fixed by reference to long-time surveying
practice.
Id. at 297, 333 N.E.2d at 360, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
Presumably the court meant that it was recognizing that property lines are fixed by the
landowners concerned by reference to long-standing surveying practice. If it meant that
property lines are fixed by the courts by reference to long-standing surveying practice, it is
difficult to see how the second half of the court's sentence is the "obverse" of the first.
108. I.e., the patentor under the Dongan patent of 1686. See note 88 supra.
109. Id. at 297, 333 N.E.2d at 360, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 55. To be more precise, this discus-
sion deals with subsequent events or conduct which may have changed the principle for
establishing the boundary line, as contemplated by the original grant. The line may have
been moved by events, such as erosion, accretion, or local tidal variations, which affect the
location of boundaries but do not change the principle for establishing them. See State v.
Bishop, 46 App. Div. 654, 359 N.Y.S.2d 817 (2d Dep't 1974). The movement of the line due
to such latter events may be constructively deemed to have been contemplated by the original
grantor, within the overall concept of "high water line." Accordingly, such movements can
be recognized without doing violence to the original grantor's intention.
110. See text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.
111. I.e. locating the line where the parties have, in actual practice, treated the line as
being.
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veyance itself. Both could conceivably be invoked in support of a
particular boundary line which, by long continued understanding
and acquiescence, has been recognized by all concerned. However,
the two are nonetheless somewhat different in their theoretical un-
derpinnings. '
Although the matter is not entirely free from confusion,112 the
distinctive role of practical location would seem to be to assist in
the interpretation of instruments of conveyance which are indefinite
as to boundaries."' For example, where a larger piece of land is
severed into two smaller parcels and the deed fails to describe the
boundary (or does so ambiguously), the conduct of the parties-e.g.,
actual patterns of occupation or putting up a fence-can dissipate
the vagueness of the deed and thereby give the courts a basis for
upholding the parties' intent."' Similarly, evidence of a prior gen-
eral understanding as to particular matter-e.g., the boundaries of
"Oak Hill Farm"-may supply a basis for enforcing a grant "of Oak
Hill Farm" even without more particular words of description." 5
Though the latter is perhaps not, strictly speaking, "practical" loca-
tion, the theoretical justification is the same; in attempting to gauge
the intent of the parties, resort to extrinsic facts, outside the formal
112. Cases may be found to the effect that "practical location" has legal significance
irrespective of any actual agreement of the boundary neighbors, and that it is a rule of repose,
resting upon the same principles as adverse possession. E.g., Katz v. Kaiser, 154 N.Y. 294,
48 N.E. 532 (1897); Jones v. Smith, 64 N.Y. 180 (1876); Baldwin v. Brown, 16 N.Y. 359 (1857).
It may indeed be that "practical location" of a boundary by the parties can gain the force of
law in appropriate cases by applying a theory of adverse possession or by an independent
theory which is analogous to adverse possession. See text accompanying notes 135-144 infra.
In cases such as Baldwin v. Brown, supra, where the deed description was quite unambiguous,
an adverse possession-type theory might be the only basis for giving the support of law to a
practical "location" different from the location described in the deed. See Sherman v. Kane,
86 N.Y. 57 (1881). However, statements in the cases to the contrary notwithstanding, it is
submitted that the distinctive role of practical location, as a determiner of boundaries, is to
supply extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent (where the deed-expressed intent is indefinite
or ambiguous), not to justify the placement of boundaries in derogation of that intent. See
Ratcliffe v. Gray, 3 Keyes 510, 513 (N.Y. 1867); Bell v. Hayes, 60 App. Div. 382, 69 N.Y.S.
898 (2d Dep't 1901). Even though this somewhat limited conceptualization of practical loca-
tion may not be entirely reconcilable with all of the judicial statements on the subject, it is
used here nonetheless in the interest of analytical clarity-to keep the operation of practical
location separate from that of adverse possession.
113. 12 AM. JUR. 2d, Boundaries § 87 (1964); 15 N.Y. JUR., Deeds § 73 (rev. 1972).
114. Harris v. Oakley, 130 N.Y. 1, 28 N.E. 530 (1891); see 12 AM. JuR. 2d, Boundaries §
88 (1964); 6 N.Y. JUR., Boundaries § 10 (1959).
115. See Jones v. Smith, 73 N.Y. 205, 209 (1878); 6 N.Y. JuR., Boundaries § 8 (1959); 15
N.Y. JUR., Deeds § 88 (rev. 1972).
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expression of intent, may give insights which will clear up uncer-
tainties. In this role, practical location is distinct from adverse pos-
session in that, unlike the latter, practical location theoretically
involves no expropriation. It merely gives the intended import to an
instrument of conveyance despite a defective expression of that in-
tent in the instrument itself. Rather than expropriate, it leaves the
parties where they intended to be, based on evidences of intent
which are found dehors the instrument.
Thus, in Dolphin Lane, it is possible that the dispositive grant"6
may have contemplated a boundary line at the line of vegetation
irrespective of where the high water line may have been. After all,
the grant apparently made no reference to high water lines; rather,
it simply granted to the town the "rivers, waters, lakes, ponds,
brooks, streams, beaches, harbors", etc."7 The high water line con-
cept is read in only as a rule of construction, yielding presumably
to any actual (and provable) contrary intention. On this theory, if
there were proof that everybody at the time assumed the line of
vegetation to be the boundary, reinforced by evidence of surveying
practice, such proof would justify the court of appeals' line-of-
vegetation test on the very terms that it was propounded: it locates
"the boundary line of property, title to which has passed from owner
to owner until it has now vested" in the present owner."' That is,
the line is not moved by the test; it is confirmed to be where it
always has been.
Unfortunately, two factors make this analysis of unlikely validity.
First, there is the reference to "beaches" in the grant to the town." 9
The word "beach" denotes lands washed by the sea,"' which lands
are per force seaward of the high water mark. Hence, the reference
to beaches shows an intention that the line of high water, not the
line of vegetation, was the boundary contemplated by the grantor.
Secondly, in order for practical location to serve as evidence of the
grantor's intention, the conduct or understandings relied on pre-
sumably would have had to exist at or about the time of the grant,
116. See note 76 supra.
117. Town of Southampton v. Mecox Bay Oyster Co., 116 N.Y. 1, 3, 22 N.E. 387 (1889),
quoting the patent in confirming the town's title to lands under water. The patent itself,
though substantially identical, reads slightly different. See notes 76, 90 supra.
118. 37 N.Y.2d at 296, 333 N.E.2d at 359, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
119. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
120. Trustees of Town of Easthampton v. Kirk, 68 N.Y. 459, 463 (1877).
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in this case in 1686.121 There is apparently no solid evidence of sur-
veying practice or other relevant conduct as of that time,'22 and
indeed the then applicable English rule of strict construction' 2 -
putting the boundary at the high water line 124-along with the
well-known "policy of the crown in not granting tidal waters to
private individuals"'25 both militate against concluding that any
such practice or conduct did exist. Thus, it appears that the bound-
ary has moved; that the line intended by the original grantor con-
trols no more.
Adverse possession, as a result of misunderstanding the original
boundary or otherwise,'26 supplies an independent basis for locating
the line at a place other than as originally created. There is no
requirement that the conduct constituting the adverse possession
have occurred at any particular time in relation to the original
grants of title. It is only necessary that the possession be continued
without interruption through a time span equal to the period of
limitations for ejectment.' 7 Thus, if there were proof in Dolphin
121. See notes 76, 88 supra.
122. There are apparently historical indications that the "meadows" were "laid out" to
private owners by the town and were susceptible to private ownership and use for cutting "last
hay" (Spartina patens) as fodder. See Brief for Appellant at 11-12, Brief for The New York
State Association of Professional Land Surveyors as Amicus Curiae at 10, Dolphin Lane
Associates, Ltd. v. Town of Southampton, 37 N.Y.2d 292, 333 N.E.2d 358, 372 N.Y.S.2d 52
(1975). But there is apparently no concrete indication that areas covered by the coarser
Spartina alterniflora (cordgrass), which requires twice-daily tidal inundation, were consid-
ered anything other than public domain. See also Brief for New York State Land Title
Association as Amicus Curiae at 19-21.
123. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
124. Bulstrode v. Hall, 82 Eng. Rep. 1024 (K.B. 1662); see Maloney & Ausness, supra note
1, at 198-200. The New York courts have interpreted the high water mark with respect to
colonial grants. Sage v. Mayor, 154 N.Y. 61, 69, 47 N.E. 1096, 1098 (1897) ("the title ends at
high water mark, as the law stood at the date of the Nichols charter and as it stands today");
accord, In re Mayor of New York, 182 N.Y. 361, 75 N.E. 156 (1905); Mayor of New York v.
Hart, 95 N.Y. 443 (1884).
125. Smithtown v. St. James Oyster Co., 80 Misc. 173, 177, 140 N.Y.S. 981, 984 (Sup.
Ct. 1913).
126. Apparently, adverse possession under a claim of right is not defeated in New York
by showing that the claimant acted under a misapprehension of fact. Brand v. Prince, 43 App.
Div. 2d 638, 349 N.Y.S.2d 222 (3d Dep't 1973). Compare Grube v. Wells, 34 Iowa 148 (1871)
with Daily v. Boudreau, 231 Ill. 228, 83 N.E. 218 (1907). See generally 21 Baylor L. Rev. 95
(1969).
127. The period is now generally ten years in New York, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 212(a) (McKin-
ney 1972), but the period is twenty years for actions by the state or a grantee (or patentee) of
the state. Id. at § 211. The doctrine of constructive adverse possession which excuses a
claimant under color of title from actual possession of the whole parcel would appear to be
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Lane (i) that the adjacent occupants from time to time had pos-
sessed their respective parcels as though the boundary were the line
of vegetation, and (ii) that the upland owner had held his possession
up to that line for the requisite period, then still another basis would
exist to justify the court of appeals' line-of-vegetation test, though
it is not the basis on which the court of appeals apparently relied.'28
However, there are several problems in fashioning an adverse pos-
session justification for the line-of-vegetation test adopted by the
court of appeals.
First, it is unlikely that there was the requisite possession by the
upland owners of the disputed tidal lands. Since 1848, it has been
the law in New York by statute2 9 that, for purposes of adverse
possession, there must either be usual cultivation or improvement
of the land or a substantial enclosure protecting it.'"" The law may
be more liberal in its definition of possession in other jurisdictions,'"'
but in New York, the statutory essentials of possession must be
present "and no others' ' 3 2 are satisfactory. Neither indicating the
disputed lands on a map as belonging to the upland owner'33 nor
inapposite. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS LAW § 511 (McKinney 1963). Under the doctrine, occu-
pation of part of the premises described in an instrument serves as occupation of the whole
premises described in the instrument. Id. But occupation of a portion of premises which is
unambiguously included in an instrument should not also be deemed to be occupation of
adjacent vacant areas which the instrument does not unambiguously include. It would be
bootstrapping to use a "color of title" theory to show possession if the purpose of showing
possession is to cure description defects in the very same instrument which is supposed to
supply the "color of title." Only if the claimants claimed under a deed describing the disputed
tidal area definitely (e.g., by courses and distances) would the doctrine of constructive ad-
verse possession seem to come into play.
128. The principles underlying adverse possession have been judicially referred to in
support of the operation of practical location as a means of determining boundaries. See note
112 supra. Consequently the court of appeals, since it was not explicit, cannot be said to have
not considered adverse possession as a possible analytical support for its holding. See text
accompanying notes. 135-44 infra.
129. N.Y. REAL PROP. AeTIONs LAW § 522 (McKinney 1963) (corresponds to Code of Proce-
dure § 85, Act of April 11, 1849, ch. 438, § 85, [1849] N.Y. Laws 634).
130. Id. § 511.
131. See, e.g., Brumigan v. Bradshaw, 39 Cal 24, 50 (1870), where the court stated: "the
acts of dominion and ownership which establish a possessio pedis must correspond, in reason-
able degree, with the size of the tract, its condition and appropriate use, and must be such
as usually accompany the ownership of land similarly situated." Accord, Ewing v. Burnett,
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 39 (1837).
132. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTIONs LAW § 522 (McKinney 1963).
133. Archibald v. New York Cent. & H.R. R.R. Co., 157 N.Y. 574, 580, 52 N.E. 567, 568
(1899).
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surveyor's practices satisfy the terms of the statute. Thus, absent
usual cultivation, improvement, or an enclosure after 1861 (when
the uplands passed to private owners),'34 it is hard to see how the
boundary could have been affected on an adverse possession theory.
An adverse possession-like policy of repose has, as previously
noted, appeared in the case law under the heading of "practical
location".'35 Apparently, long-term acquiescence in a boundary line
(probably for the period of limitations on ejectment 3 ') will have the
effect of legitimizing the line even though the claimant cannot show
actual possession up to the line for the applicable period of limita-
tions.'37 However, in order for such an "adverse-acquiescence"
theory to affect a boundary, the line must be definite and the ac-
quiescence must be by both parties.'38 In particular, it is required
that the losing party knew the location of the line acquiesced in and,
probably, he must have joined in establishing it.'39 This "adverse-
acquiescence" type of practical location could supply fairly compel-
ling support for the court of appeals' conclusion that the boundary
line in Dolphin Lane lies at the line of vegetation; it could, that is,
provided that the long-standing practice of surveyors can be trans-
lated into acquiescence on the part of the town.
But what, precisely, did the town acquiesce in? Certainly there
is no indication that the town ever objected to the surveyor's prac-
tice. But neither is there evidence that it had any reason to.'4 So
134. See text accompanying notes 93.94 supra.
135. See note 112 supra.
136. Corning v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory, 44 N.Y. 577, 595 (1871); Fisher v. McVean, 25
App. Div. 2d 575, 266 N.Y.S.2d 951 (3d Dep't 1966).
137. E.g., Baldwin v. Brown, 16 N.Y. 359 (1857); Ratcliffe v. Gray, 3 Keyes 510 (N.Y.
1867); Konchar v. Leichtman, 35 App. Div. 2d 890, 315 N.Y.S.2d 888 (3d Dep't 1970); Fischer
v. McVean, 25 App. Div. 2d 575, 266 N.Y.S.2d 951 (3d Dep't 1966); Bell v. Hayes, 60 App.
Div. 382, 69 N.Y.S. 898 (2d Dep't 1901).
138. Adams v. Warner, 209 App. Div. 394, 204 N.Y.S. 613 (3d Dep't 1924); Whitney v.
Dudley, 40 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Hubbell v. McCullough, 47 Barb. 287 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1866).
139. Corning v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory, 44 N.Y. 577, 595-96 (1871).
140. Prior to the court of appeals' decision in Dolphin Lane, courts in New York had been
defining the "high water line" formulation according to the tides rather than by references
to vegetation. Sage v. Mayor, 154 N.Y. 61, 70, 47 N.E. 1096, 1098 (1897) ("title ... did not
extend beyond the dry land .. "); Dunham v. Townsend, 118 N.Y. 281, 23 N.E. 367 (1890);
State v. Bishop, 46 App. Div. 2d 654, 359 N.Y.S.2d 867 (2d Dep't 1974); Board of Educ. v.
Nyquist, 51 Misc. 2d 902, 274 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd, 28 App. Div. 2d 936, 281
N.Y.S.2d 486 (3d Dep't 1967). The town should have likewise been justified in assuming that
the actual line of high water was the boundary even though erroneous notions on this point
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far as can be told, there were never any trespasses under claim of
right on the disputed premises nor any other legal wrongs commit-
ted which would trigger the town into action.' Nor was there any
fence built or other act to designate the boundary on the locus in
quo. '4 If the court of appeals has held that title may be lost by
acquiescing in conduct that is not unlawful (i.e., the surveyor's
practice of mismapping boundaries), and in the absence of any tres-
pass or other cause of action, it is not likely that it has contributed
much to the "stability and predictability of matters involving title."
Moreover, such a result would be directly contrary to holdings in,
may have persisted elsewhere.
The court of appeals cited an opinion of the New York Attorney General, 33 STATE DEP'T
REP. 415 (1925) to support the "authenticity" of the surveying practice of following the
vegetation line. The Attorney General noted that, in a number of other jurisdictions, the high
water line is "found at the point where the action of the waters ceases to affect the soil or
the vegetation upon it." Id. at 418 (emphasis added). See Maloney & Ausness, supra note 1,
at 256-58. The Attorney General's opinion concluded that "in most instances ... the test
[is] . . . point or extent to which the upland vegetation survives or would survive excepting
for the presence and action of the waters." 33 STATE DEP'T REP. at 421 (emphasis added). But
the court of appeals fixed the boundary, not by the line of upland vegetation, but by reference
to the line of Spartina alterniflora, a species that requires tidal inundation twice daily in order
to colonize or thrive. See text accompanying notes 78-82 supra. Thus, the court of appeals
cited the Attorney General's opinion, but seems to have missed its clear import, viz. that the
actual line of high water is the boundary and that upland vegetation is merely a convenient
indicator of where that line of high water would lie.
141. Cf. Adams v. Rockwell, 16 Wend. 285, 302 (Ct. Err. N.Y. 1836) ("the party whose
right is to be thus barred must have silently looked on and seen the other party doing acts.").
142. There is no evidence that any of the historical surveys were ever made for the specific
purpose of delineating the boundaries between town lands (under water) and the several
parcels held by upland owners. An apparently key survey of the area in question in Dolphin
Lane, the so-called Cook Survey made in 1900, appears to have been primarily for the purpose
of mapping inland areas, rather than to fix the boundary at the coast. Brief for Appellant at
6, Dolphin Lane Associates, Ltd. v. Town of Southampton, 37 N.Y.2d 292, 333 N.E.2d 358,
372 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1975). The field notes for the Cook Survey were inadequate to map a shore
line. 72 Misc. 2d at 880, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 979. In any event, it is doubtful that the Cook Survey
would be relevant to a boundary determination unless there was proof of, inter alia, the
competency of the surveyor and the purpose of the survey. Ramapo Mfg. Co. v. Mapes, 216
N.Y. 362, 367, 110 N.E. 772, 775 (1915).
For the purposes of convenience, it has been the practice of many surveyors to map the
apparent shore line (viz. at the line of vegetation) rather than the real high water line
especially where the exact coastal boundary is irrelevant to the purpose of the survey. Malo-
ney & Ausness, supra note 1, at 252. This fact, rather than customary acceptance of the line
of vegetation as the boundary, may best explain the "long-standing practice of surveyors"
which was relied on by the court of appeals. Thus to support its new "test" for fixing shore
boundaries, the court may have adopted a practice which itself was never intended to desig-
nate those boundaries definitively.
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for example, the prescriptive easement area where "negative" ease-
ments (e.g., of light and air) cannot be acquired by long-term "ac-
quiescence" of the servient neighbor.'43 However, even assuming
that title may be lost by acquiescence in a mere claim, and that
acquiescence by the town were shown, the suitability of such a basis
for the Dolphin Lane holding ought still to be subject to the objec-
tions"' applicable to the more usual type of adverse possession.
One of these objections to supporting the new boundary with an
adverse possession theory (or an adverse possession-type theory) is
that, in this case as in the usual case, the title being extinguished
is that of a public body, of a municipality, as here, or of the state
itself. To be sure, the title to lands held by the state or a municipal-
ity can be extinguished by adverse possession, though the period of
limitations is twenty years for the state or its grantees (or patentees)
rather than the ten year period which applies in the case of private
owners.' However, the power of private persons to acquire title to
public lands by adverse possession is subject to limitations not appl-
icable to adverse possession generally; such public lands may not,
it is said, be acquired by adverse possession if held by the state or
municipality in a sovereign governmental capacity4 ' or held in trust
for the public good," 7 but they may be acquired by the adverse
possessor if held in a proprietary capacity.'48 Likewise, public lands
which are inalienable cannot, it is said, be lost by adverse posses-
sion.'49
143. See, e.g., Parker & Edgerton v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1838).
144. See text accompanying notes 145-58 infra.
145. See note 127 supra.
146. Town of Hornellsville v. City of Hornell, 38 App. Div. 2d 312, 328 N.Y.S.2d 941 (4th
Dep't 1972); Hinkley v. State, 202 App. Div. 570, 195 N.Y.S. 914 (3d Dep't), af'd, 234 N.Y.
309, 137 N.E. 327 (1922); Long Island Research Bureau v. Town of Hempstead, 203 Misc.
619, 118 N.Y.S.2d 39 (Sup. Ct. 1952), aff'd, 283 App. Div. 663, 126 N.Y.S.2d 857 (2d Dep't
1954), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 818, 125 N.E.2d 872 (1955).
147. Smith v. People, 9 App. Div. 2d 205, 193 N.Y.S.2d 127 (3d Dep't 1959); People v.
Baldwin, 197 App. Div. 285, 188 N.Y.S. 542 (3d Dep't 1921), aff'd, 233 N.Y. 672, 135 N.E.
964 (1922); cf. Long Island Beach Buggy Ass'n. v. Islip, 58 Misc. 2d 295, 295 N.Y.S.2d 268
(Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 35 App. Div. 2d 739, 316 N.Y.S.2d 430 (2d Dep't 1970).
148. E.g., People v. Trinity Church, 22 N.Y. 44 (1860); People v. Arnold, 4 N.Y. 508
(1851); Hamlin v. People, 155 App. Div. 680, 140 N.Y.S. 643 (4th Dep't 1913).
149. City of N.Y. v. Wilson & Co., 278 N.Y. 86, 15 N.E.2d 408 (1938); Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Shultz, 116 N.Y. 382, 22 N.E. 584 (1889); Arnold's Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 63 Misc. 2d
279, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Banner Milling Co. v. State, 117 Misc. 33, 191 N.Y.S.
143 (Ct. Cl. 1921), modified on other grounds, 210 App. Div. 812, 205 N.Y.S. 911 (4th Dep't
1924), af'd, 240 N.Y. 533, 148 N.E. 668, cert. denied, 269 U.S. 582 (1925).
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On the basis of these principles, it has been fairly consistently
held that title to publicly-owned waterlands cannot be acquired by
adverse possession. 150 These holdings are sometimes on the grounds
that such lands are held as sovereign or for the public good 5' and
sometimes on the grounds that the lands being inalienable, are not
subject to loss by adverse possession.'52 However, the cases are not
uniform in holding that publicly-owned waterlands are immune to
acquisition by adverse possession. A few decisions have held that
title may be acquired by an adverse possessor whenever the public
lands in question were alienable.' It has also been said, in dicta,
that where waterlands are not held in trust for the public, title to
them may be acquired by adverse possession.'54 But these cases
upholding an adverse possession-title on the grounds of alienability
do not mention the fact that the lands in question may nonetheless
have been held in a governmental capacity or in trust for the public.
In short, the New York cases on adverse possession of publicly-
owned waterlands are not easily reconciled. However, it seems clear
that the fact that waterlands may be alienable should remove only
one of two objections to allowing title to be lost by this process.
Alienable or no, waterlands still may be (and generally are)'55
150. In re Piers Old Nos. 8-11, 228 N.Y. 140, 126 N.E. 809 (1920); Knickerbocker Ice Co.
v. Shultz, 116 N.Y. 382, 22 N.E. 584 (1889); In re Roma, 223 App. Div. 769, 227 N.Y.S. 46
(2d Dep't 1928); Hinkley v. State, 202 App. Div. 570, 195 N.Y.S. 914 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 234
N.Y. 309 (1922); Campbell v. Rodgers, 182 App. Div. 791, 170 N.Y.S. 258 (1st Dep't 1918);
Gunn v. Bergquist, 201 Misc. 992, 108 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1951); In re East River Drive,
159 Misc. 741, 289 N.Y.S. 443 (Sup. Ct. 1936), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 1007, 21 N.Y.S.2d 507,
appeal denied, 260 App. Div. 847, 23 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1940).
151. E.g., Hinkley v. State, 202 App. Div. 570, 195 N.Y.S. 914 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 234 N.Y.
309 (1922).
152. In re Piers Old Nos. 8-11, 228 N.Y. 140, 126 N.E. 809 (1920); Gunn v. Bergquist, 201
Misc. 992, 108 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1951); In re East River Drive, 159 Misc. 741, 289 N.Y.S.
443 (Sup. Ct. 1936), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 1007, 21 N.Y.S.2d 507, appeal denied, 260 App. Div.
847, 23 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1940).
153. Reid v. New York, 274 N.Y. 178, 8 N.E.2d 326 (1937); In re City of New York, 217
N.Y. 1,111 N.E. 256 (1916); Timson v. Mayor, 5 App. Div. 424, 39 N.Y.S. 248 (1896); Arnold's
Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 63 Misc. 2d 279, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1970).
154. Gottfried v. State, 23 Misc. 2d 733, 747, 201 N.Y.S.2d 649, 666 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
155. See, e.g., Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 234 N.Y. 15, 136 N.E. 224 (1922); In re Long
Sault Dev. Co., 212 N.Y. 1, 105 N.E. 849 (1914); Hinkley v. State, 202 App. Div. 570, 195
N.Y.S. 914 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 234 N.Y. 309, 137 N.E. 327 (1922). Instruments such as the
Dongan and Andross patents, see note 76 supra, were governmental in nature and intended
to form the basis of political communities, Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 411
(1842), and the lands they conveyed were to be held by the recipient municipalities in a
governmental or quasi-sovereign capacity for the benefit of the public, People ex rel. Palmer
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deemed to be held by the state (or municipality) in a governmental
capacity-for the public good-and this in itself should be enough
to prevent their unilateral appropriation by private claimants. 5"
The state "cannot lose such lands as it holds for the public, in trust
for a public purpose ... ."I" A forest preserve is a classic example
of public trust lands immune to adverse possession. 5 ' Should tide-
washed lands, also held in a public trust and similarly important
for preservation, be any different? It is not easy to see why.
However, the greatest obstacle to an adverse possession justifica-
tion for the court's holding is that, for adverse possession to change
boundaries, the presence of its elements must be considered on a
case by case basis. The fact that A has acquired prescriptive title
against B does not mean that A's neighbor has also acquired such a
title. Yet, by announcing what appears to be a rule of property,
v. Travis, 223 N.Y. 150, 119 N.E. 437 (1918); Town of Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N.Y. 74, 78,
80 N.E. 665, 667 (1907); People ex rel. Howell v. Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 259, 54 N.E. 682, 685
(1899).
156. Compared with the obvious policy objective of the governmental ownership or "pub-
lic good" limitation on adverse possession, the alienability test is merely a technical one, and
it thus should yield whenever the technicality of inalienability is not present. It appears that
the theory behind the inalienability test is that a grant to a private individual of inalienable
lands cannot be presumed, precluding title by adverse possession. See People v. System
Properties, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 330, 141 N.E.2d 429, 160 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1957); City of New York
v. Wilson & Co., 278 N.Y. 86, 97, 15 N.E.2d 408, 413 (1938); Smith v. People, 9 App. Div. 2d
205, 193 N.Y.S.2d 127 (3d Dep't 1959). Or perhaps the explanation is that the policy judgment
which led to establishing particular lands as inalienable applies as well to exempt such lands
from the statute of limitations. See 2 N.Y. JUR., Adverse Possession § 102 (1958). In any event,
it appears that waterlands are alienable by the state (subject to the jus publicum), see text
accompanying notes 41, 49 supra, and indeed the Public Lands Law authorizes certain offi-
cers of the state to make such conveyances thereof as "they shall deem necessary to promote
the commerce of this state, or . ..for the purpose of beneficial enjoyment of the same by
the adjacent owner for the benefit of the public at large." N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW §75(7)
(McKinney Supp. 1974). Apparently municipal owners of waterlands have similar powers to
make conveyances. Arnold's Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 63 Misc.2d 279, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1970),
citing City of New York v. Wilson & Co., supra. And the only general restriction upon such
powers of alienation (other than the preservation, with qualification, of the jus publicum)
would seem to be the limitation on massive transfers to other than upland owners. See
authorities at notes 47, 48 supra. Whether allowing every upland owner to acquire a piece of
the foreshore, as the court of appeals has done, would be a massive transfer invalid under
earlier cases, is problematical. Implicitly, the court of appeals seems to have held in Dolphin
Lane that it would not.
157. People v. Baldwin, 197 App. Div. 285, 288, 188 N.Y.S. 542, 545 (3d Dep't 1921), af'd,
233 N.Y. 672, 135 N.E. 964 (1922).
158. People v. Shipley, 229 App. Div. 21, 241 N.Y.S. 17 (3d Dep't 1930); People v. Bald-
win, 197 App. Div. 285, 188 N.Y.S. 542 (1921), aff'd, 233 N.Y. 672, 135 N.E. 964 (1922); Helms
v. Diamond, 76 Misc. 2d 253, 349 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
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possibly applicable to all shore boundaries in the state, the court of
appeals has moved the line for everybody. By stating that the high
water line means the line of vegetation, the court has, in effect,
replaced the high water line rule with an entirely different rule,
exactly the sort of midstream change of rules that it set out to avoid.
From the foregoing, it appears to be the undeniable effect of the
court of appeals' decision in Dolphin Lane to place the boundary
seaward of the actual line of high water. Although the court's lim-
ited purpose was to define the seaward extent of the upland fee,
there is nothing in the opinion which suggests that the court has not,
at the same time, defined the landward extent of the jus publicum
as well. Information as to the actual high water line (hydrographic
data) was said to have "no legal significance."' 59 In making its line-
of-vegetation rule a rule of property, the court has turned a question
of intent de facto into a question of policy. The policy which the
court seeks to promote (the protection of long-standing expecta-
tions) would seem to apply equally whether the question was one of
ownership per se (as in Dolphin Lane) or the question of what lands
are burdened by the public's right to use. Thus, if the line-of-
vegetation test is appropriate to control the seaward limit of lands
extending to the sea it should, on the same policy basis, control the
landward extent of the jus publicum as well.'
But either way, whether or not the court has definitively settled
the landward extent of the jus pub licum, the decision seems to have
impacts which transcend the narrow controversy before it and which
appear to be, on balance, not good.
In the first place, by moving the boundary seaward (based on past
practices), the court has given legal effect to a fairly massive expro-
priation of the public's property in favor of upland owners. 6' Substi-
159. 37 N.Y.2d at 295, 333 N.E.2d at 359, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
160. However, not all of the jus publicum can be lost in lands upward of the line of
vegetation. The federal government's paramount power to regulate commerce and navigation,
see note 40 supra, cannot be diminished by the court of appeals. And apparently federal law
controls the definitions and limitations (spatial and otherwise) on this federal power. Bonelli
Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973); Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10
(1935). It has already been held that tidal marshlands in New York are "navigable" within
the United States Constitution and federal courts may enjoin (under the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970)), the filling of such areas. United States v. Baker, 2 Envir.
Rptr. Cas. 1849 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
161. The court did not specifically decide whether its line-of-vegetation test would also
apply in those cases where that line was actually inland from the actual line of high water. If
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tuting a line-of-vegetation test for the line of high water as the
standard of demarcation has changed the title to the jus privatum
in the lands between the two lines. Since public bodies hold even
the jus privatum in such lands "in trust for the public good,"' 62
whereas the title to uplands (as newly defined) is not so held, this
aspect of the decision alone can be considered to be public-
adverse." 3 But the legal consequences of the expropriation do not
stop there.
For one thing, the decision may impair or jeopardize the tidal
wetlands preservation and management program which it is the
recently confirmed policy of the state to promote. Under the Tidal
Wetlands Act, enacted in 1973,164 lands subject to protection are
defined as "those areas which border on or lie beneath tidal waters
. . ,"I5 Prior to the court of appeals' holding in Dolphin Lane, the
lands sought to be protected were, in large part, owned either by
local municipalities or by the state itself, in trust for the public
good. Regulation of the uses of these lands, even those owned by
municipalities, 6' would have been unobjectionable, notwithstand-
the "high water line" formulations were defined by reference to the line of vegetation in those
cases as well, the net amount of land removed from the public domain would be less, with
losses in some shore areas being offset by gains in others. There might even be a net increase
in the public domain.
However, for at least two reasons, it appears unlikely that the line-of-vegetation test will
control in situations where the vegetation line is inland from the "real" high water line. First,
the court predicated its holding on long-standing surveying practice and the expectations
created thereby. Unless, as is doubtful, surveyors have long fixed boundaries on bare beaches
by reference to the line-of-vegetation, the theory of Dolphin Lane would seem inapplicable.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the expropriation of private owners, via a redefini-
tion of the term "high water line" would probably be unconstitutional. See Hughes v. Wash-
ington, 389 U.S. 290, 294-98 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring), approved in Bonelli Cattle Co.
v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 331 (1973). The public, as such, having no comparable constitutional
protection as against the state, see note 34 supra, cannot complain of expropriation through
seaward movements of the boundary on this basis; but private persons can complain of
landward movements. Consequently, the effect of Dolphin Lane seems to be to define the
boundary as the high water line or the long-recognized line of vegetation, whichever is the
more seaward. The result is a net expropriation of public lands.
162. Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 234 N.Y. 15, 21, 136 N.E. 224, 225 (1921); see note
155 supra.
163. The adverse effect would, of course, be exacerbated if, as is apparently the case, the
line-of-vegetation test also defines the upland for the purposes of jus publicum as well. See
text accompanying note 159 supra.
164. N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 790 (McKinney 1973)(codified at N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSERVATION LAW, art. 25 (McKinney Supp. 1974)).
165. N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW § 25-0103(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
166. The rights and powers of municipalities being subject to the state's sovereign powers,
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ing that the regulation mandated outright preservation, prohibiting
all use. However, with Dolphin Lane, management programs which
heretofore may have been regulation of the public domain now be-
come the regulation of private property. Hence, if heavy regula-
tion-e.g., prohibition of all uses-is deemed desirable, the result
may be a flood of constitutional challenges, claiming compensation
for takings in eminent domain. The flood may have indeed already
begun.'67
The prospects for the success of such constitutional challenges
have been treated amply and ably elsewhere, 6 ' but the problem is
essentially this:'69
While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking . . . this is a question of degree ....
And this "question of degree" may be a serious one. Owing to the
fragile ecological nature of wetland areas, the appropriate regulation
may well be outright preservation, prohibiting any use at all of
much of the wetlands in the state. Yet, it is hard to imagine a degree
of regulation that goes further than a complete prohibition of all use.
Admittedly, the distinction between police power regulation and
takings by eminent domain is a hazy one at best, and it cannot even
be said that there are uniformly accepted lip-service standards for
making the distinction. 7 " However, courts in other jurisdictions
have overturned regulations similar in object with the New York
Tidal Wetlands Act where the restrictions were "so burdensome
. . . that they are the equivalent of an outright taking."'' And in
see note 34 supra, municipalities would have much greater difficulty making a constitutional
case of "taking by regulation" than would private persons. People ex rel. Palmer v. Travis,
223 N.Y. 150, 165-66, 119 N.E. 437, 442-43 (1918). Under the original Tidal Wetlands Act,
N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 790 (McKinney 1973) lands acquired by eminent domain are exempt
from regulation. However, this exemption was recently repealed. N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 136
(McKinney 1975).
167. Already there has been a challenge to the constitutionality of the Tidal Wetlands Act
on the grounds that it operates to take property for public use without just compensation.
New York Housing Auth. v. Commissioner of Environmental Conservation, - Misc. 2d
-, 372 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Sup. Ct. 1975). The court was able to side-step the constitutional
issue this time by declaring the challenge to be "premature." Id. at -, 372 N.Y.S.2d at
150. But this floodgate will not hold forever.
168. Comment, supra note 1, at 459-74.
169. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922).
170. Comment, supra note 1 at 459-74.
171. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 715 (Me. 1970); accord, Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n,
161 Conn. 24, 31, 282 A.2d 907, 910-11 (1971) ("the plaintiff's use of his property is non-
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New York, a regulation may constitute a taking that requires com-
pensation to the landowner if "the consequent restrictions upon his
property preclude its use for any purpose to which it is reasonably
adapted." 7 '
Should appropriate management of the wetlands mean their pres-
ervation from encroachments by all destructive uses, the power of
the state to effect such management, without paying just compensa-
tion, has now become more questionable. As previously noted, it has
already been questioned.' To be sure, the court of appeals still has
not ruled that extensive or prohibitory regulation under the Tidal
Wetlands Act would exceed the police power; thus, it can still be
hoped at least that the court will not require the public to buy back
the lands which were lost in Dolphin Lane. But no one can be sure.
Another consequence of Dolphin Lane may be to arrest develop-
ment, even by legislation, of any systemized approach to delineating
shore boundaries at the high water line. Such systemized ap-
proaches, accompanied by programs of shore surveys and mapping,
have been adopted or considered for adoption in other states.74 With
such legislation, surveys, and mapping, it is possible to give scien-
tific definiteness to the shore boundaries within a legislated high
water line standard. However, in New York, such a legislature-
mandated systemized approach may be now impossible because the
court of appeals has not only rejected the relevance of scientific data
in locating the line of high water, it also adopted a substitute test,
as a rule of property, to serve as the exclusive indicator of the "high
water line" location. By thus concretizing the meaning of "high
existent unless he happens to own a boat"); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Town-
ship of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963). But see Marks v. Whiting, 6
Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971); Just v. Mannette Co., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201
N.W.2d 761 (1972).
172. Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 226, 15 N.E.2d 587, 589 (1938);
see Williams v. Town of Oyster Bay, 32 N.Y.2d 78, 295 N.E.2d 788, 343 N.Y.2d 118 (1973).
173. See note 167 supra.
174. Florida Coastal Mapping Act of 1974, ch. 74-56, [1974] Fla. Laws 34. A proposed
Model Coastal Mapping Act, on which the Florida statute is based, is reproduced and de-
scribed by its draftsmen in Maloney & Ausness, supra note 1, at 241-73. This model act was
produced with the assistance of personnel of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration and the National Ocean Survey (formerly the Coast & Geodetic Survey), which has
been mapping the United States coastline since 1835. Under the Model Act, accurate coastal
surveys are to be produced (section 6) which will constitute evidence (but not exclusive
evidence) in court (section 10), and the mean high water mark is to be determined by
scientific methods approved by an agency formed thereunder (section 15).
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water line," tying it by law to a visible and definitely locatable
reference, the line-of-vegetation test may forever preclude other
boundary standards of lesser generosity to upland owners. The test,
as a rule of property, creates vested rights.'75
So long as the operative term "high water line" remained an
abstract linguistic formulation, it remained susceptible, within lim-
its, to a certain flexibility of interpretation-able to meet the exi-
gencies of particular cases. Various types of evidence could be intro-
duced, subject only to the rule of relevancy, to show where the
''real" line was located-all without violence to the concept that the
actual line of high water, if ascertained, would control. But even
more importantly, as an abstract formulation, the term did not
preclude the introduction, by the legislature or the courts, of ever
more informative techniques to determine the intended boundary
location.
The court of appeals felt that constant replacement of old scien-
tific techniques with even more refined ones would mean constant
changes in the on-the-site line,' but in fact it would not. The line
would stay the same (subject to erosion, accretion and the like),
though the surveyor's approximation of the line might vary some-
what. This discrepancy between the "real" line and the surveyor's
line might be critical in the case of a $1000 per square foot downtown
urban lot; but at the shore it is tolerable, given the types of potential
uses to which the shore may be put and, more to the point, given
the "approximate" nature of high water lines in any event' 77
Thus, for a scant benefit in terms of "predictability,"' 7 s the court
of appeals has frozen-perhaps forever-the definition in this state
175. See Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 311 (1973), citing Hughes v. Wash-
ington, 389 U.S. 290, 294-98 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
176. See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
177. It may be argued that it was never a good idea to adopt an uncertain standard like
the "high water line" as the basis of a rule of construction. This may be so, and a more certain
standard, e.g., the line of vegetation, may have always made more sense. However, if one is
to accept the court of appeals' thesis in Dolphin Lane, now hardly seems to be a good
time-after 300 years of titles granted in reliance on the "high water line" rule-to make a
change.
178. In any event, the "predictability" achieved is somewhat lessened by the fact that,
at least for federal purposes (navigation and commerce) the "real" high water line, based on
the tides, will continue to apply. See note 160 supra. Thus, in New York there are now two
standards for fixing the boundary of the bay, the state line-of-vegetation test, applicable for
some purposes, and the federal high water test, applicable for others.
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of "high water line," placing it by law at the line of vegetation.
Although the court said that conforming shore boundaries to hydro-
graphic data is an innovation which "should be left to the Legisla-
ture," '179 the court's new rule of property may have left the legisla-
ture constitutionally powerless to act.
179. 37 N.Y.2d at 296, 333 N.E.2d at 360, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
